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The Soviets, already [http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/venona/1944/24may_roosevelt.pdf covertly informed] of Roosevelt's declining health, bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].<ref>At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes," write [http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Robert Louis Benson] and [[#refBenson95|Cecil Phillips]], "through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: 13</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

The Soviets, already [http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/venona/1944/24may_roosevelt.pdf covertly informed] of Roosevelt's declining health, bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].<ref>At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes," write [http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Robert Louis Benson] and [[#refBenson95|Cecil Phillips]], "through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: 13</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]]&mdash;the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols] of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>

Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''&mdash;actually three delegations&mdash;the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx not be disclosed] until 1947.

Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''&mdash;actually three delegations&mdash;the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx not be disclosed] until 1947.