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When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://politicom.moldova.org/news/moscow-attempts-to-reinterpret-the-molotovribbentrop-pact-203326-eng.html essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]]—the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols] of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. As [http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2004-General-Nonfiction Pulitzer prize winning] [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/biographies/anne-applebaum.html ''Washington Post'' columnist] Anne Applebaum put it, Yalta "went beyond mere recognition of Soviet occupation and conferred legality and international acceptance on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/10/AR2005051001187.html new borders and political structures]." It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>
When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://politicom.moldova.org/news/moscow-attempts-to-reinterpret-the-molotovribbentrop-pact-203326-eng.html essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]]—the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols] of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. As [http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2004-General-Nonfiction Pulitzer prize winning] [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/biographies/anne-applebaum.html ''Washington Post'' columnist] Anne Applebaum put it, Yalta "went beyond mere recognition of Soviet occupation and conferred legality and international acceptance on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/10/AR2005051001187.html new borders and political structures]." It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>
Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yalta_Conference.aspx not be disclosed] until 1947.
Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would not be disclosed until 1947.<ref>Michael Kort, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=xAnwfRnsl6oC The Columbia Guide to the Cold War]'' (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) ISBN 0231107730, p. 179</ref>
According to [http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/byrnes-james.htm James F. Byrnes], then director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, he and others returned from Yalta to Washington on February 10, but Roosevelt stayed behind with a select few—including Hiss:
According to [http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/byrnes-james.htm James F. Byrnes], then director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, he and others returned from Yalta to Washington on February 10, but Roosevelt stayed behind with a select few—including Hiss: