Changes

In sharp contrast to the smooth cooperation of the Allies, the Luftwaffe ignored opportunities for strategic and economic cooperation with the air forces of its allies Italy, Finland, Romania, and Hungary.  Instead of using factories in France, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia to build new air fleets, it removed the machinery and shut the factories.<ref> James S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War Ii: Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation." ''Air Power History'' 2004 51(2): 4-19. Issn: 1044-016x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>   

In sharp contrast to the smooth cooperation of the Allies, the Luftwaffe ignored opportunities for strategic and economic cooperation with the air forces of its allies Italy, Finland, Romania, and Hungary.  Instead of using factories in France, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia to build new air fleets, it removed the machinery and shut the factories.<ref> James S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and its Allied Air Forces in World War Ii: Parallel War and the Failure of Strategic and Economic Cooperation." ''Air Power History'' 2004 51(2): 4-19. Issn: 1044-016x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>   

==Collapse==

==Collapse==

By 1942 everything started to go wrong.  Defeat after defeat in the air against increasingly superior enemy planes sapped morale, and killed off the best pilots.  Göring was easily outmaneuvered by rival Nazis after 1940 and the Luftwaffe experienced an erosion of authority after it failed to meet his grandiose promises.  Hitler was enthusiastic in support, believing air power was the supreme strategic weapon; but he never understood air affairs, even though he talked glibly about them. He did not coordinate the Luftwaffe with the other branches of service, and Göring systematically misled him about Luftwaffe progress.  Hotler did not plan in terms of continuous massive quantity and quality in the number of planes or in their offensive use. He thought in terms of defense or of secret, magic weapons for one massive, catastrophic blow.<ref> Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy" </ref>   

By 1942 everything started to go wrong.  Defeat after defeat in the air against increasingly superior enemy planes sapped morale, and killed off the best pilots.  Göring was easily outmaneuvered by rival Nazis after 1940 and the Luftwaffe experienced an erosion of authority after it failed to meet his grandiose promises.  Hitler was enthusiastic in support, believing air power was the supreme strategic weapon; but he never understood air affairs, even though he talked glibly about them. He did not coordinate the Luftwaffe with the other branches of service, and Göring systematically misled him about Luftwaffe progress.  Hitler did not plan in terms of continuous massive quantity and quality in the number of planes or in their offensive use. He thought in terms of defense or of secret, magic weapons for one massive, catastrophic blow.<ref> Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy" </ref>   

===Secret weapons===

===Secret weapons===

Luftwaffe technology was not well concentrated. The [[Me-262]] jet flew test runs in 1939--Germany needed 10,000 of these superior planes but only produced 1000 and most never flew in combat. Again, Hitler personally intervened in a manner providential &mdash; for the Allies. He insisted that the Me-262 not be deployed until it could carry out bombing missions, for which it was not designed. He only allowed it in a devastating air defense role when it was too late.  Likewise the brilliant engineering efforts that went into the highly innovative [[V-1]] jet-powered cruise missile and [[V-2]] rocket-powered ballistic missile were partly wasted from a narrow military point of view; their guidance was too inaccurate to threaten any target smaller than a metropolitan area.  On the other hand, the Allies diverted up to 25% of the air power to attacks on the V-weapons. (The Luftwaffe was responsible for the V-1, while the army was in charge of the V-2.)  

Luftwaffe technology was not well concentrated. The [[Me-262]] jet flew test runs in 1939--Germany needed 10,000 of these superior planes but only produced 1000 and most never flew in combat. Again, Hitler personally intervened in a manner providential &mdash; for the Allies. He insisted that the Me-262 not be deployed until it could carry out bombing missions, for which it was not designed. He only allowed it in a devastating air defense role when it was too late.  Likewise the brilliant engineering efforts that went into the highly innovative [[V-1]] jet-powered cruise missile and [[V-2]] rocket-powered ballistic missile were partly wasted from a narrow military point of view; their guidance was too inaccurate to threaten any target smaller than a metropolitan area.  On the other hand, the Allies diverted up to 25% of the air power to attacks on the V-weapons. (The Luftwaffe was responsible for the V-1, while the army was in charge of the V-2.)