Changes

In [http://books.google.com/books?id=jVZ-AAAACAAJ his memoirs], Churchill's bodyguard Walter Thompson would later recall seeing the Prime Minister

In [http://books.google.com/books?id=jVZ-AAAACAAJ his memoirs], Churchill's bodyguard Walter Thompson would later recall seeing the Prime Minister

{{cquote|[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article581067.ece weeping over the concessions Roosevelt made to Stalin at Yalta] in 1945. "Why, Thompson, did they allow the president, almost dying on his feet, to be there?" he asked. "All Europe will suffer from the decisions made at Yalta."}}

{{cquote|[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article581067.ece weeping over the concessions Roosevelt made to Stalin at Yalta] in 1945. "Why, Thompson, did they allow the president, almost dying on his feet, to be there?" he asked. "All Europe will suffer from the decisions made at Yalta."}}

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss's role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref>

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss's role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest,<ref>Laura Tyson Li, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tnbMSIL077wC Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady]'' (Open City Books, 2006) ISBN 0871139332, p. 267</ref> alleging the existence of a "Communist conspiracy within the State Department."<ref>Don Lohbeck, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=eJ44AAAAIAAJ Patrick J. Hurley]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1956), p. 447</ref> Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944 [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists], I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest,<ref>Laura Tyson Li, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tnbMSIL077wC Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady]'' (Open City Books, 2006) ISBN 0871139332, p. 267</ref> alleging the existence of a "Communist conspiracy within the State Department."<ref>Don Lohbeck, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=eJ44AAAAIAAJ Patrick J. Hurley]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1956), p. 447</ref> Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944 [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists], I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

The Soviets, already [http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/venona/1944/24may_roosevelt.pdf covertly informed] of Roosevelt's declining health, bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].<ref>At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. According to Robert Louis Benson, former Technical Director for Counterintelligence at the National Security Agency<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Agenda], 2009 Cryptologic History Symposium, Center for Cryptologic History (National Security Agency - Central Security Service), p. 3</ref> (NSA), and Cecil Phillips, a cryptanalyst who was instrumental in [[#refBenson95|cracking the Soviet code]], "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes, through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: 13</ref> But Venona is not the only source: new evidence from the Soviet archives supports the thesis that Hiss was a Soviet spy at the time of the Yalta Conference.<ref>Serhii Plokhy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=0wOKfjnXdAUC Yalta: The Price of Peace]'' (Penguin, 2010) ISBN 0670021415, "Introduction"</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

The Soviets, already [http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/venona/1944/24may_roosevelt.pdf covertly informed] of Roosevelt's declining health, bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].<ref>At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. According to Robert Louis Benson, former Technical Director for Counterintelligence at the National Security Agency<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Agenda], 2009 Cryptologic History Symposium, Center for Cryptologic History (National Security Agency - Central Security Service), p. 3</ref> (NSA), and Cecil Phillips, a cryptanalyst who was instrumental in [[#refBenson95|cracking the Soviet code]], "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes, through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: 13</ref> But Venona is not the only source: new evidence from the Soviet archives supports the thesis that Hiss was a Soviet spy at the time of the Yalta Conference.<ref>Serhii Plokhy, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=0wOKfjnXdAUC Yalta: The Price of Peace]'' (Penguin, 2010) ISBN 0670021415, "Introduction"</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://politicom.moldova.org/news/moscow-attempts-to-reinterpret-the-molotovribbentrop-pact-203326-eng.html essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]]&mdash;the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols] of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. As [http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2004-General-Nonfiction Pulitzer prize winning] [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/biographies/anne-applebaum.html ''Washington Post'' columnist] Anne Applebaum put it, Yalta "went beyond mere recognition of Soviet occupation and conferred legality and international acceptance on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/10/AR2005051001187.html new borders and political structures]." It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://politicom.moldova.org/news/moscow-attempts-to-reinterpret-the-molotovribbentrop-pact-203326-eng.html essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]]&mdash;the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols] of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. As [http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2004-General-Nonfiction Pulitzer prize winning] [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/biographies/anne-applebaum.html ''Washington Post'' columnist] Anne Applebaum put it, Yalta "went beyond mere recognition of Soviet occupation and conferred legality and international acceptance on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/10/AR2005051001187.html new borders and political structures]." It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>

Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''&mdash;actually three delegations&mdash;the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would not be disclosed until 1947.<ref>Michael Kort, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=xAnwfRnsl6oC The Columbia Guide to the Cold War]'' (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) ISBN 0231107730, p. 179</ref>

Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''&mdash;actually three delegations&mdash;the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] (who would be dead in less than a month) to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> This agreement would not be disclosed until 1947.<ref>Michael Kort, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=xAnwfRnsl6oC The Columbia Guide to the Cold War]'' (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) ISBN 0231107730, p. 179</ref>