| − | In the field of [[evolution|evolutionary]] game theory, an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population. | + | In the field of '''[[evolution|evolutionary]] game theory''', an 'evolutionarily stable strategy or '''ESS''' is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population. |