Changes

==Historiography ==

==Historiography ==

English historian Arnold Toynbee introduced the concept in 1884 into English after the French political writer Louis Blanqui used it in 1837<ref>Usher (1920) p 247;  [http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/toynbee/indrevArnold Toynbee, ''Lectures On The Industrial Revolution In England'']</ref>. Historians debate the dating of the Industrial Revolution. T.S. Ashton places it roughly between 1760 and 1830.  In the early 20th century historians (such as [[Charles Beard]]) looking for the social forces they thought controlled history, emphasized industrialization and urbanization. These were forces unleashed by the industrial revolution.  By the mid 20th century attention was turning to the broader concept of "modernization," which included industrialization, urbanization, and psychological changes and changes in values.  Eric Hobsbawm called it "probably the most important event in human history," but emphasizes the effects were not fully felt until the 1830s or 1840s.<ref>Hobsbawm 1988, p. 46 </ref>.  By the late 20th century postmodern historians largely stopped looking for deep explanatory forces, or sharp turning points, and stressed instead complexity and interrelationships. Crafts has emphasized the slow overall growth rate of the economy before 1830, suggesting that a real revolution should have higher rates.  The higher rates came after 1830, but only after the industrial system and the new growth-oriented mindset had been well established in numerous sectors. The era is was a decisive point for modern technology, and for the formation of the working class.<ref> Berg and Hudson, (1992)</ref>

English historian [[Arnold Toynbee]] introduced the concept in 1884 into English after the French political writer Louis Blanqui used it in 1837<ref>Usher (1920) p 247;  [http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/toynbee/indrevArnold Toynbee, ''Lectures On The Industrial Revolution In England'']</ref>. Historians debate the dating of the Industrial Revolution. T.S. Ashton places it roughly between 1760 and 1830.  In the early 20th century historians (such as [[Charles Beard]]) looking for the social forces they thought controlled history, emphasized industrialization and urbanization. These were forces unleashed by the industrial revolution.  By the mid 20th century attention was turning to the broader concept of "modernization," which included industrialization, urbanization, and psychological changes and changes in values.  Eric Hobsbawm called it "probably the most important event in human history," but emphasizes the effects were not fully felt until the 1830s or 1840s.<ref>Hobsbawm 1988, p. 46 </ref>.  By the late 20th century postmodern historians largely stopped looking for deep explanatory forces, or sharp turning points, and stressed instead complexity and interrelationships. Crafts has emphasized the slow overall growth rate of the economy before 1830, suggesting that a real revolution should have higher rates.  The higher rates came after 1830, but only after the industrial system and the new growth-oriented mindset had been well established in numerous sectors. The era is was a decisive point for modern technology, and for the formation of the working class.<ref> Berg and Hudson, (1992)</ref>

Goldstone (2002) argues that many premodern and non-Western economies show spurts or efflorescences of economic growth, including sustained increases in both population and living standards, in urbanization, and in underlying technological change. Medieval Europe, Golden Age Holland, and Qing China, among other cases, show such remarkable efflorescences of impressive economic growth.Yet these did not lead to modern industrialized societies. The distinctive feature of Western economies since 1800 has not been growth per se, but growth based on a specific set of elements: engines to extract motive power from fossil fuels, to a degree hitherto rarely appreciated by historians; the application of empirical science to understanding both nature and practical problems of production; and the marriage of empirically oriented science to a national culture of educated craftsmen and entrepreneurs broadly educated in basic principles of mechanics and experimental approaches to knowledge. This combination developed from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries only in Britain, and was unlikely to have developed anywhere else in world history.

Goldstone (2002) argues that many premodern and non-Western economies show spurts or efflorescences of economic growth, including sustained increases in both population and living standards, in urbanization, and in underlying technological change. Medieval Europe, Golden Age Holland, and Qing China, among other cases, show such remarkable efflorescences of impressive economic growth.Yet these did not lead to modern industrialized societies. The distinctive feature of Western economies since 1800 has not been growth per se, but growth based on a specific set of elements: engines to extract motive power from fossil fuels, to a degree hitherto rarely appreciated by historians; the application of empirical science to understanding both nature and practical problems of production; and the marriage of empirically oriented science to a national culture of educated craftsmen and entrepreneurs broadly educated in basic principles of mechanics and experimental approaches to knowledge. This combination developed from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries only in Britain, and was unlikely to have developed anywhere else in world history.