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:Unfortunately, the success of government secrecy in this case has seriously distorted our understanding of post-[[World War II]] history. Hundreds of books and thousands of essays on [[Joseph_McCarthy#Tensions_of_the_times|McCarthyism]], the federal loyalty security program, Soviet espionage, American communism, and the early [[Cold War]] have perpetuated many myths that have given Americans a warped view of the nation's history in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. <ref>Haynes, John Earl & Klehr, Harvey ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America'', Yale University Press, (2000), p. 18. ISBN 0300084625. </ref>
:Unfortunately, the success of government secrecy in this case has seriously distorted our understanding of post-[[World War II]] history. Hundreds of books and thousands of essays on [[Joseph_McCarthy#Tensions_of_the_times|McCarthyism]], the federal loyalty security program, Soviet espionage, American communism, and the early [[Cold War]] have perpetuated many myths that have given Americans a warped view of the nation's history in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. <ref>Haynes, John Earl & Klehr, Harvey ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America'', Yale University Press, (2000), p. 18. ISBN 0300084625. </ref>
==History==
The U.S. Army project to decrypt coded [[USSR|Soviet]] cables began in 1943.<ref>[https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm Preface], Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds., ''[https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/venona.htm Venona: Soviet Espionage and The American Response, 1939-1957]'' (National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996)</ref> The following year, Finnish intelligence officers approached the [[OSS]] mission in Stockholm with an offer to sell some 1,500 pages of material relating to Soviet codes, including a code used by the [[NKVD]].<ref>Thomas Powers, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=6ZS4Y7gmT84C Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda]'' (New York Review of Books, 2004) ISBN 1590170989, p. 15</ref> Finnish troops had acquired the scorched codebooks and cryptographic materials in June 1941, during the [[USSR|Soviet]] invasion of [[Finland]].<ref>[https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm Preface], Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds., ''[https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/venona.htm Venona: Soviet Espionage and The American Response, 1939-1957]'' (National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996)</ref> Stettinius told OSS Director [[William J. Donovan|Donovan]] to reject the offer on the grounds that [[Russia]] was an ally, but the OSS purchased the material anyway. At the instigation of the [[State Department]], [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] ordered Donovan to return the material to the Soviets forthwith. After a failed attempt to deliver it to [[Pavel Fitin]], head of NKVD foreign intelligence, the material was finally handed over to Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Andrei Gromyko.<ref>Thomas Powers, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=6ZS4Y7gmT84C Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda]'' (New York Review of Books, 2004) ISBN 1590170989, pp. 15-16</ref> As a result, the application of this material to decrypting the Venona traffic would be delayed until 1953.<ref>Robert Louis Benson, Venona Historical Monograph #1: [http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations] (Fort George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995</ref>
After November 1944, “decrypts of messages were shown to President Roosevelt by a United States Naval Officer whose duty it was to take the decrypts to the White House.”<ref>Robert Louis Benson and Cecil Phillips, ''[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB278/01.PDF History of Venona]'' (Fort George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), p. 38</ref> In May 1945 a U.S. Army intelligence team discovered a second codebook at a German signals intelligence archive in Saxony, in territory assigned to the Soviet zone of occupation. Only a day or so prior to Soviet occupation of the area, the team removed the material, which then made its way to the Army's Signals Intelligence Service (SIS).<ref>John Earl Haynes, [http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0305&week=c&msg=22Pqnm844qaMxYtDmAjBPg&user=&pw= Venona Codebooks], H-DIPLO Discussion Logs, May 19, 2003</ref> But several months before the war would end on August 14, 1945, Brigadier General Carter Clarke of Army G-2 (Intelligence) would notify SIS that he had received instructions from the [[White House]] to "cease any effort against the [[Soviet]] problem."<ref>Thomas R. Johnson, ''American Cryptology during the Cold War: 1945-1989.'' [http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/cold_war_i.pdf Book I: The Struggle for Centralization 1945-1960], (Fort George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), p. 159 (PDF 172) This report goes on to say that it was later discovered that the [[White House]] staff had been infiltrated by a [[Communist]] or "[[fellow traveller|fellow traveler]]."</ref>
On June 4, 1945, six weeks after becoming [[President]], [[Harry Truman]] was briefed about [[Venona project|Venona]], according to former [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) officer Oliver Kirby, deputy director of the [[Russian]] code-breaking project. Based on notes Kirby made at the time, Jerrold Schecter, former National Security Council spokesman for the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, reported that Clarke, chief of the then-new Army Security Agency (precursor of the NSA), advised President Truman that the code-breakers were decrypting messages that revealed massive [[Soviet]] intelligence operations in the [[United States]], though it was too early to identify operatives or operations.<ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M2pbieYYHrYC Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History]''(Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books Inc., 2002) ISBN 1574883275, pp. 147, 110. Truman's appointment calendar [http://trumanlibrary.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1945&currMonth=6&currDay=4 confirms the meeting] with Clarke.</ref> According to Kirby, Clarke described this meeting as "NDG" (no damn good),<ref>Robert D. Novak, "[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp The Origins of McCarthyism: What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it?]," ''The Weekly Standard'', Vol. 8, Issue 41 (June 30, 2003)</ref> the president telling the general that his account of code-breaking sounded "like a fairy story."<ref>William A. Rusher, "[http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1375/article_detail.asp A Closer Look Under The Bed]," ''Claremont Review of Books'', Vol. IV, No. 4 (Fall 2004)</ref>
==Background==
==Background==