| | Despite France taking the lead role in the intervention, the Congressional Research Service reports, "Only the United States and NATO possess the command and control capabilities necessary for coalition operations enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya." France only recently rejoined the NATO alliance, in 2008, after a 40 year absence. The Congressional Research Service, which analyzes information and prepares reports for members of Congress, also states, | | Despite France taking the lead role in the intervention, the Congressional Research Service reports, "Only the United States and NATO possess the command and control capabilities necessary for coalition operations enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya." France only recently rejoined the NATO alliance, in 2008, after a 40 year absence. The Congressional Research Service, which analyzes information and prepares reports for members of Congress, also states, |
| − | {{Cquote|In spite of statements underscoring NATO unity on steps announced to date, the initial planning and operational phases were also marked by significant levels of discord within Europe and [[NATO]] on the aims and future direction of the mission. A key point of contention was reportedly the amount of flexibility that NATO forces would be granted to protect civilians and civilian areas, as called for in paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1973. Reports indicate that French officials insisted on maintaining the ability to strike ground forces that threatened civilian areas, while their [[Turkish]] counterparts vocally opposed any targeting of ground forces. Adding to the strain within NATO, NATO ally [[Germany]] abstained from UNSCR 1973 and, opposed to any potential [[combat]] operation, on March 23, withdrew its naval assets in the [[Mediterranean]] from NATO command. Throughout the first week of operations, other European allies contributing to the mission, including Italy and Norway, expressed increasing frustration with the lack of agreement within NATO, with Norway refusing to deploy its fighter jets unless under they were under NATO command and control.}} | + | {{Cquote|In spite of statements underscoring NATO unity on steps announced to date, the initial planning and operational phases were also marked by significant levels of discord within Europe and [[NATO]] on the aims and future direction of the mission. A key point of contention was reportedly the amount of flexibility that NATO forces would be granted to protect civilians and civilian areas, as called for in paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1973. Reports indicate that French officials insisted on maintaining the ability to strike ground forces that threatened civilian areas, while their [[Turkish]] counterparts vocally opposed any targeting of ground forces. Adding to the strain within NATO, NATO ally [[Germany]] abstained from UNSCR 1973 and, opposed to any potential [[combat]] operation, on March 23, withdrew its naval assets in the [[Mediterranean]] from NATO command. Throughout the first week of operations, other European allies contributing to the mission, including Italy and Norway, expressed increasing frustration with the lack of agreement within NATO, with Norway refusing to deploy its fighter jets unless under they were under NATO command and control.<ref>Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): |
| | + | Background and Issues for Congress, ''Congressional Research Service,'' March 30, 2011, p. 20 pdf.</ref>}} |