Changes

In the first two decades of the Meiji period (1868-1912) the country's leaders engaged in intense discussions about the future of the capital of Tokyo. The Fifty-Ward System, was part of the effort by the new government to strengthen control over the people. It preserved the Town Official System and the deliberative organ of representatives of Edo, but dissolved the ruling system of the headmen. It soon gave way to the Large and Small Ward System.  Some planners argued for the importance of urban beautification, while others regarded changes in urban infrastructure and services as essential to maintenance and growth of the city. Many of the proposed changes were cloaked in the language of progress. Phillips (1996) examines the course taken by urban leaders of the first decades of the Meiji period in establishing planning policy, using planning documents, transcripts of planning committees, and on architectural and urban design data from completed urban improvement projects in Meiji Tokyo. Phillips (1996) focuses on two issues, (1) the extent to which the efforts of Japanese leaders focused the country on the goal of modernization, and (2) the extent to which efforts to achieve bunmei kaika, or cultural enlightenment, were superficial. He demonstrates how the concepts of modernity and the struggle to develop a modern urban structure altered previous notions of cities and city planning practices. Poor articulation of planning policy in the first decades of the Meiji period reflected a lack of consensus among Meiji leaders about the definition and course of modernization. Rather than reject traditional approaches to planning, urban leaders eventually incorporated these approaches into their new planning methodologies. Modernity in the Japanese context, consequently, did not require dismantling preexisting urban structures. Instead, it represented a marriage of the political motivations of the country's leaders with the modern urban needs for improved transportation networks and zoning mechanisms. Exposure of the political system to popular opinion entailed the shifting of planning discourse from the theoretical to the practical realm, as well as from the private to the public realm.<ref>  David Peter Phillips, "Intersections of Modernity and Tradition: An Urban Planning History of Tokyo in the Early Meiji Period (1868-1888)."  (PhD U. of Pennsylvania 1996) </ref>

In the first two decades of the Meiji period (1868-1912) the country's leaders engaged in intense discussions about the future of the capital of Tokyo. The Fifty-Ward System, was part of the effort by the new government to strengthen control over the people. It preserved the Town Official System and the deliberative organ of representatives of Edo, but dissolved the ruling system of the headmen. It soon gave way to the Large and Small Ward System.  Some planners argued for the importance of urban beautification, while others regarded changes in urban infrastructure and services as essential to maintenance and growth of the city. Many of the proposed changes were cloaked in the language of progress. Phillips (1996) examines the course taken by urban leaders of the first decades of the Meiji period in establishing planning policy, using planning documents, transcripts of planning committees, and on architectural and urban design data from completed urban improvement projects in Meiji Tokyo. Phillips (1996) focuses on two issues, (1) the extent to which the efforts of Japanese leaders focused the country on the goal of modernization, and (2) the extent to which efforts to achieve bunmei kaika, or cultural enlightenment, were superficial. He demonstrates how the concepts of modernity and the struggle to develop a modern urban structure altered previous notions of cities and city planning practices. Poor articulation of planning policy in the first decades of the Meiji period reflected a lack of consensus among Meiji leaders about the definition and course of modernization. Rather than reject traditional approaches to planning, urban leaders eventually incorporated these approaches into their new planning methodologies. Modernity in the Japanese context, consequently, did not require dismantling preexisting urban structures. Instead, it represented a marriage of the political motivations of the country's leaders with the modern urban needs for improved transportation networks and zoning mechanisms. Exposure of the political system to popular opinion entailed the shifting of planning discourse from the theoretical to the practical realm, as well as from the private to the public realm.<ref>  David Peter Phillips, "Intersections of Modernity and Tradition: An Urban Planning History of Tokyo in the Early Meiji Period (1868-1888)."  (PhD U. of Pennsylvania 1996) </ref>

====1923 Kanto earthquake====

===1923 Kanto earthquake===

Ar noon on Saturday 1 September 1923, the eathquake hit, registering 8.3 on the Richter scale. The epicentre was in Sagami Bay, about 80 km south of Tokyo. The earthquake was followed five minutes later by a huge tsunami, with a height of about 12 meters.  As fires swept across the city, 75% of all buildings suffered severe structural damage. The quake cut most of the water mains. About 100,000 people were killed from an urban population of about 4.5 million.<ref> Estimates of deaths vary widely, from 70,000 to 140,000.</ref> Some 40,000 refugees died in one location at the Honjo Military Clothing Depot on the banks of the Sumida River. They were huddling together in the building as the cyclone of superheated air passed overhead and sucked out their air so that they died instantly of suffocation. Property damage came to two per cent of Japan's total national wealth. Two million people were homeless.  

Ar noon on Saturday 1 September 1923, the eathquake hit, registering 8.3 on the Richter scale. The epicentre was in Sagami Bay, about 80 km south of Tokyo. The earthquake was followed five minutes later by a huge tsunami, with a height of about 12 meters.  As fires swept across the city, 75% of all buildings suffered severe structural damage. The quake cut most of the water mains. About 100,000 people were killed from an urban population of about 4.5 million.<ref> Estimates of deaths vary widely, from 70,000 to 140,000.</ref> Some 40,000 refugees died in one location at the Honjo Military Clothing Depot on the banks of the Sumida River. They were huddling together in the building as the cyclone of superheated air passed overhead and sucked out their air so that they died instantly of suffocation. Property damage came to two per cent of Japan's total national wealth. Two million people were homeless.