Changes

*'''moral non-naturalists''' deny that ethical properties can be identified with non-ethical properties. Although it may well be true that whatever causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people is good, that itself cannot be a definition of good. G.E. Moore is the most well-known advocate for this position - he believed that, since "Is whatever causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people always good?" appears to be a valid question, that cannot be a simple definition of what good is, even if the answer is 'Yes'. He compared it with questions such as 'Are all bachelors unmarried?' and 'Are all the barbers in the village bald?'. Although the answer in both cases could be 'Yes', clearly in the first case the answer has to be 'Yes', whereas in the second case it doesn't have to be, even if it actually is. He saw questions about morals as being like the second rather than the first question ("open" rather than "closed" questions), and hence he concluded the property of being good could never be simply defined. This argument of his is known as the open question argument. He saw 'good' as being like 'yellow' - we cannot give a precise definition of it, but we can indicate what it is by giving examples.

*'''moral non-naturalists''' deny that ethical properties can be identified with non-ethical properties. Although it may well be true that whatever causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people is good, that itself cannot be a definition of good. G.E. Moore is the most well-known advocate for this position - he believed that, since "Is whatever causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people always good?" appears to be a valid question, that cannot be a simple definition of what good is, even if the answer is 'Yes'. He compared it with questions such as 'Are all bachelors unmarried?' and 'Are all the barbers in the village bald?'. Although the answer in both cases could be 'Yes', clearly in the first case the answer has to be 'Yes', whereas in the second case it doesn't have to be, even if it actually is. He saw questions about morals as being like the second rather than the first question ("open" rather than "closed" questions), and hence he concluded the property of being good could never be simply defined. This argument of his is known as the open question argument. He saw 'good' as being like 'yellow' - we cannot give a precise definition of it, but we can indicate what it is by giving examples.

*'''moral sense theory''' believes that all human beings have an inner sense, like the external senses of vision or hearing, by which one can directly and immediately ascertain the truth or falsehood of moral propositions - although, just as some people have better vision or hearing than others, this sense may be more accurate for some people than for others

*'''moral sense theory''' believes that all human beings have an inner sense, like the external senses of vision or hearing, by which one can directly and immediately ascertain the truth or falsehood of moral propositions - although, just as some people have better vision or hearing than others, this sense may be more accurate for some people than for others

*'''divine command theory''' believes that the good is simply whatever God commands; if God had commanded murder instead, then murder would have been good. The problem with this view, is that if 'good' is simply whatever God commands, then to call God himself 'good' is an empty statement (of course God obeys his own commandments). An alternative viewpoint sees 'good' as being part of God's perfect and eternal divien nature, which is unchangeable - God could never command murder, since to do so would violate His own nature

*'''divine command theory''' believes that the good is simply whatever God commands; if God had commanded murder instead, then murder would have been good. The problem with this view, is that if 'good' is simply whatever God commands, then to call God himself 'good' is an empty statement (of course God obeys his own commandments).

*'''divine nature theory''' sees 'good' as being part of God's perfect and eternal divien nature, which is unchangeable - God could never command murder, since to do so would violate His own nature. This avoids the problem of divine command theory mentioned above.

 

== Normative ethics ==

== Normative ethics ==