Changes

Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. The brain Stettinius most depended upon was that of his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853 [PDF 19]). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10 [PDF 15-16])</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref>

Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. The brain Stettinius most depended upon was that of his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853 [PDF 19]). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10 [PDF 15-16])</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref>

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703580904574638352930354872.html withered and diminished] Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. Cf. Rose McDermott, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=N_G-wELa3xYC Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008) ISBN 0521882729, pp. 96-110; Bert Edward Park, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=hSnUtD0-nWIC Ailing, Aging, Addicted: Studies of Compromised Leadership]'' (University Press of Kentucky, 1993) ISBN 0813118530, pp. 200, 207</ref> His face was "gray, gaunt, and sagging and the muscles controlling the lips seemed to have lost part of their function," wrote journalist John Gunther. "I felt certain that he was going to die."<ref>John Gunther, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=pRd3AAAAMAAJ Roosevelt in retrospect: a profile in history]'' (Harper, 1950), p. 29</ref> "In our evaluation of President Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and I agreed that he was a sick man at Yalta and should not have been called upon to make decisions affecting this country and the world," wrote James Farley, former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. "Physical illness, we knew, taxed his mind and left him in no shape to bargain with such hard bargainers as the Russians..."<ref>James A. Farley, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=xebpf5ccGHkC Jim Farley's Story - The Roosevelt Years]'' (Read Books, 2007) ISBN 1406724548, p. 376</ref> “The President seemed placid and frail,” wrote [[Winston Churchill]]. “I felt that he had a slender contact with life.”<ref>Sir Winston Churchill, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M_6cljKX0uUC Triumph and Tragedy]'' (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986) ISBN 0395410606, p. 348</ref> "Winston is puzzled and distressed," noted Churchill's physician. "The President no longer seems to the P.M. to take an intelligent interest in the war; often he does not seem even to read the papers the P.M. gives him."<ref>This may have been due to FDR's "inability to follow the text," perhaps due to "a dysfunction in the right posterior portion of the brain." Claude R. Marx, "[http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2010/01/02/a_journalist_and_neurologist_examine_fdrs_deadly_secret/ A Second Opinion on FDR’s Condition]," ''Boston Globe'', January 2, 2010. Cf. Steven Lomazow and Eric Fettmann, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=usRaPgAACAAJ FDR's Deadly Secret]'' (PublicAffairs, 2010) ISBN 1586487442</ref> He commented:

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703580904574638352930354872.html withered and diminished] Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. Cf. Rose McDermott, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=N_G-wELa3xYC Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008) ISBN 0521882729, pp. 96-110; Bert Edward Park, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=hSnUtD0-nWIC Ailing, Aging, Addicted: Studies of Compromised Leadership]'' (University Press of Kentucky, 1993) ISBN 0813118530, pp. 200, 207</ref> His face was "gray, gaunt, and sagging and the muscles controlling the lips seemed to have lost part of their function," wrote journalist John Gunther. "I felt certain that he was going to die."<ref>John Gunther, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=pRd3AAAAMAAJ Roosevelt in retrospect: a profile in history]'' (Harper, 1950), p. 29</ref> According to James Farley, former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee:

{{cquote|"Everyone seemed to agree that the President had gone to bits physically....He intervened very little in discussions, sitting with his mouth open....I doubt, from what I have seen, whether he is fit for his job here."<ref>Jerrold M. Post and Robert S. Robins, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SvU-aEsPWdoC When Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King]'' (Yale University Press, 1995) ISBN 0300063148, p. 26</ref> To a doctor's eye, the president appears a sick man. He has all the symptoms of hardening of the arteries of the brain in an advanced stage....<ref>[[#refWilson2002|Wilson 2002]]: 276-277</ref>}}

{{cquote|In our evaluation of President Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and I agreed that he was a sick man at Yalta and should not have been called upon to make decisions affecting this country and the world. Physical illness, we knew, taxed his mind and left him in no shape to bargain with such hard bargainers as the Russians...<ref>James A. Farley, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=xebpf5ccGHkC Jim Farley's Story - The Roosevelt Years]'' (Read Books, 2007) ISBN 1406724548, p. 376</ref>}}

Roosevelt's cardiologist agreed: At the conference, Roosevelt “was obviously greatly fatigued,” he observed. “His color was very poor (gray).”<ref>Edward Shorter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3scUP7B_R7kC Doctors and Their Patients: A Social History]'', 3rd Ed. (Transaction Publishers, 1991) ISBN 088738871X, p. 100</ref> Dr. Roger Lee, then president of the American Medical Association, wrote during Yalta that Roosevelt “was irascible and became very irritable if he had to concentrate his mind for long. If anything was brought up that wanted thinking out he would change the subject.”<ref>[[#refWilson2002|Wilson 2002]]: 276</ref> According to ''Chicago Tribune'' reporter Orville Dwyer, Dr. Louis E. Schmidt, a confidante of Roosevelt’s daughter Anna, told him that at Yalta FDR suffered frequent brain seizures, during which

Roosevelt's cardiologist agreed: At the conference, Roosevelt “was obviously greatly fatigued,” he observed. “His color was very poor (gray).”<ref>Edward Shorter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3scUP7B_R7kC Doctors and Their Patients: A Social History]'', 3rd Ed. (Transaction Publishers, 1991) ISBN 088738871X, p. 100</ref> Dr. Roger Lee, then president of the American Medical Association, wrote during Yalta that Roosevelt “was irascible and became very irritable if he had to concentrate his mind for long. If anything was brought up that wanted thinking out he would change the subject.”<ref>[[#refWilson2002|Wilson 2002]]: 276</ref> According to ''Chicago Tribune'' reporter Orville Dwyer, Dr. Louis E. Schmidt, a confidante of Roosevelt’s daughter Anna, told him that at Yalta FDR suffered frequent brain seizures, during which

{{cquote|he would be unconscious (completely out) although sitting up and apparently functioning for periods of from a few seconds to several minutes. Dr Schmidt said he has no doubt from his conversations with Anna that these were occurring regularly at the time he was meeting with Churchill and Stalin and holding other momentous conferences of the utmost importance to the United States.  He said the effect would be that he would be cognizant of what was going on, then suddenly lose the thread completely for anywhere from a few seconds to two or three minutes&mdash;and that he could not possibly have known what was going on in between.<ref>Steven Lomazow , "[http://hnn.us/articles/126978.html The Truth About 'The Sick Man At Yalta']," History News Network (George Mason University), May 24, 2010</ref>}}

{{cquote|he would be unconscious (completely out) although sitting up and apparently functioning for periods of from a few seconds to several minutes. Dr Schmidt said he has no doubt from his conversations with Anna that these were occurring regularly at the time he was meeting with Churchill and Stalin and holding other momentous conferences of the utmost importance to the United States.  He said the effect would be that he would be cognizant of what was going on, then suddenly lose the thread completely for anywhere from a few seconds to two or three minutes&mdash;and that he could not possibly have known what was going on in between.<ref>Steven Lomazow , "[http://hnn.us/articles/126978.html The Truth About 'The Sick Man At Yalta']," History News Network (George Mason University), May 24, 2010</ref>}}

In [http://books.google.com/books?id=jVZ-AAAACAAJ his memoirs], Churchill's bodyguard Walter Thompson would later recall seeing the Prime Minister

In [http://books.google.com/books?id=jVZ-AAAACAAJ his memoirs], Churchill's bodyguard Walter Thompson would later recall seeing the Prime Minister

{{cquote|[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article581067.ece weeping over the concessions Roosevelt made to Stalin at Yalta] in 1945. "Why, Thompson, did they allow the president, almost dying on his feet, to be there?" he asked. "[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article581067.ece All Europe will suffer from the decisions made at Yalta]."}}

{{cquote|weeping over the concessions Roosevelt made to Stalin at Yalta] in 1945. "Why, Thompson, did they allow the president, almost dying on his feet, to be there?" he [Churchill] asked. "[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article581067.ece All Europe will suffer from the decisions made at Yalta]."}}

====China====

====China====

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss's role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that Acheson would subsequently use as a pretext to obstruct aid to China<ref>After failing to get aid to China cut off officially, Acheson would instruct his subordinates in 1949 that "it is desirable that shipments be delayed where possible to do so without formal action." (David S. McLellan, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SfJ2AAAAMAAJ Dean Acheson: the State Department years]'' [New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976] ISBN 0396073131, p. 188) After the fall of China, Senator John F. Kennedy would comment: "Mr. Speaker, over this weekend we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the [Truman] White House and the [Acheson] Department of State. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the [[Owen Lattimore|Lattimore]]s and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the democratic system in China after twenty years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China." John F. Kennedy, ''A Compendium of Speeches, Statements, and Remarks Delivered During His Service in the Congress of the United States'' (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 41-42. Cf. [[#refEvans07|Evans 2007]]: 419</ref>&mdash;a move that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref>

During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss's role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction&mdash;a policy that Acheson would subsequently use as a pretext to obstruct aid to China<ref>After failing to get aid to China cut off officially, Acheson would instruct his subordinates in 1949 that "it is desirable that shipments be delayed where possible to do so without formal action." (David S. McLellan, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SfJ2AAAAMAAJ Dean Acheson: the State Department years]'' [New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976] ISBN 0396073131, p. 188) After the fall of China, Senator John F. Kennedy would comment: "Mr. Speaker, over this weekend we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the [Truman] White House and the [Acheson] Department of State. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the [[Owen Lattimore|Lattimore]]s and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the democratic system in China after twenty years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China." John F. Kennedy, ''A Compendium of Speeches, Statements, and Remarks Delivered During His Service in the Congress of the United States'' (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 41-42. Cf. [[#refEvans07|Evans 2007]]: 419</ref>&mdash;a move that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref>