| | On February 23, 2011 senior U.S. and Pakistani military officers met at a resort on the [[Oman]]i coast. After several more weeks of secret negotiations, political pressure by Pakistani officials on the courts, and a pledge of $2.3 million in “blood money” from the U.S. government, Davis was released on March 16, 2011 and quickly removed from the country. The outcome left many Pakistanis feeling that their [[secular]] judicial system had been seriously manipulated, in large part by the U.S. government. | | On February 23, 2011 senior U.S. and Pakistani military officers met at a resort on the [[Oman]]i coast. After several more weeks of secret negotiations, political pressure by Pakistani officials on the courts, and a pledge of $2.3 million in “blood money” from the U.S. government, Davis was released on March 16, 2011 and quickly removed from the country. The outcome left many Pakistanis feeling that their [[secular]] judicial system had been seriously manipulated, in large part by the U.S. government. |
| − | The Davis affair sharpened Pakistani attention to—and acrimony toward—the presence of U.S. personal in Pakistan. Revelation of Davis as a CIA contractor led the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, to demand a full accounting of all such operatives working in Pakistan.<ref>Pakistani Agency Demands Data on CIA Contractors New York Times, February 25, 2011; U.S.-Pakistan Intelligence Operations Frozen Since January, Reuters, April 9, 2011.</ref> | + | The Davis affair sharpened Pakistani attention to—and acrimony toward—the presence of U.S. personal in Pakistan. Revelation of Davis as a CIA contractor led the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, to demand a full accounting of all such operatives working in Pakistan.<ref>Pakistani Agency Demands Data on CIA Contractors, ''[[New York Times]]'', February 25, 2011; U.S.-Pakistan Intelligence Operations Frozen Since January, Reuters, April 9, 2011.</ref> |
| − | In mid-April 2011, the ISI Chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha was in the United States to meet with [[Obama administration]] CIA Director [[Leon Panetta]]. Reports described Pasha as making significant demands for greater control over covert U.S. action in his country, as well as calls for a steep reduction in the number of CIA operatives and Special Forces in Pakistan, and a halt to drone strikes there. The demand to remove more than 300 American personnel was said to have come from Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.<ref>Pakistan Tells U.S. It Must Sharply Cut C.I.A. Activities, New York Times, April 12, 2011.</ref> The CIA reportedly agreed to be more open with Pakistani authorities about such employees and their activities, as well as more cooperative when planning strikes in Pakistan.<ref>CIA , Pakistan Working to Repair Widening Rift in Relationship,” Washington Post, April 13, 2011.</ref> | + | In mid-April 2011, the ISI Chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha was in the United States to meet with [[Obama administration]] CIA Director [[Leon Panetta]]. Reports described Pasha as making significant demands for greater control over covert U.S. action in his country, as well as calls for a steep reduction in the number of CIA operatives and Special Forces in Pakistan, and a halt to drone strikes there. The demand to remove more than 300 American personnel was said to have come from Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.<ref>Pakistan Tells U.S. It Must Sharply Cut C.I.A. Activities, New York Times, April 12, 2011.</ref> The CIA reportedly agreed to be more open with Pakistani authorities about such employees and their activities, as well as more cooperative when planning strikes in Pakistan.<ref>CIA , Pakistan Working to Repair Widening Rift in Relationship, ''[[Washington Post]]'', April 13, 2011.</ref> |