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| | But, if an indifferent physical thing alone is omnipresent within non-indifferent living creatures, then there is an 'omnipresence of a transcendent indifference', which allows any living creature to be justified in any thought or act by mere appeal to himself as the sole judge of himself. So, a transcendent omnipresence of an indifferent physical thing, apart from God, allows what may be called 'pure individualism', (not to be confused with the [[individualism]] that exists in the initial state of a mutually accounted group of individuals). | | But, if an indifferent physical thing alone is omnipresent within non-indifferent living creatures, then there is an 'omnipresence of a transcendent indifference', which allows any living creature to be justified in any thought or act by mere appeal to himself as the sole judge of himself. So, a transcendent omnipresence of an indifferent physical thing, apart from God, allows what may be called 'pure individualism', (not to be confused with the [[individualism]] that exists in the initial state of a mutually accounted group of individuals). |
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| − | == Balancing Omnipresence and Transcendence == | + | == Balancing omnipresence and transcendence == |
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| | On the face of it, there seems to be a problem of balancing omnipresence with [[transcendence]]. This is because the rational creature has mainly a practical view of physics, and thus a practical view of God. If a physical thing is pictured in the rational creature's mind as most directly omnipresent, then the picture is one of an homogenous physical world made up of that one thing alone. But, since physical things are observed to vary both in substance and form, the only thing which is at first imagined to be omnipresent is a thing which is imagined to transcend particular substances and forms. But, at that point, there seems to be an effort to keep from being forced to one side or the other: to holding that something must be transcendent and thus precluding its omnipresence, or to holding that something must be omnipresent and thus precluding its transcendence, [[Deism]] and [[Pantheism]] respectively. | | On the face of it, there seems to be a problem of balancing omnipresence with [[transcendence]]. This is because the rational creature has mainly a practical view of physics, and thus a practical view of God. If a physical thing is pictured in the rational creature's mind as most directly omnipresent, then the picture is one of an homogenous physical world made up of that one thing alone. But, since physical things are observed to vary both in substance and form, the only thing which is at first imagined to be omnipresent is a thing which is imagined to transcend particular substances and forms. But, at that point, there seems to be an effort to keep from being forced to one side or the other: to holding that something must be transcendent and thus precluding its omnipresence, or to holding that something must be omnipresent and thus precluding its transcendence, [[Deism]] and [[Pantheism]] respectively. |
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| | So, God must be both transcendent ''and'' omnipresent in order to be God. But, then, is God more transcendent that He is omnipresent? But, if we assume that God's transcendence and omnipresence are equally 'weighted', then, by what logical mechanisms might we '''''see''''' them as equally 'weighted'? | | So, God must be both transcendent ''and'' omnipresent in order to be God. But, then, is God more transcendent that He is omnipresent? But, if we assume that God's transcendence and omnipresence are equally 'weighted', then, by what logical mechanisms might we '''''see''''' them as equally 'weighted'? |
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| − | The belief of Pantheism may be the result of admitting the natural sense that God is omnipresent while rejecting, or else failing take into account, the sense that God is transcendent. Deism may be the result of believing in the transcendence of God while failing to see how God can actually be present in His Creation without '''''being''''' His Creation.
| + | == Equating omnipresence with transcendence == |
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| − | In any case, there is a dualistic view of God's omnipresence and God's transcendence. This is the view that God's omnipresence is different from God's transcendence. So, there is, then, a need to balance them. | + | The belief of Pantheism may be the result of admitting the natural sense that God is omnipresent while rejecting, or else failing take into account, the sense that God is transcendent. Deism may be the result of believing in the transcendence of God while failing to see how God can actually be present in His Creation without '''''being''''' His Creation. In any case, there seems to be is a dualistic view of God's omnipresence and God's transcendence: God's omnipresence is different from God's transcendence. So, there seems to be a need to balance them with respect to each other. |
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| | But, there may be at least one way to resolve the seeming conflict between God's omnipresence and God's transcendence: by allowing that the classical geometric point may actually exist. | | But, there may be at least one way to resolve the seeming conflict between God's omnipresence and God's transcendence: by allowing that the classical geometric point may actually exist. |