| | Apologists might often disagree as to how an apparent contradiction is to be best explained, due to nobody knowing for sure what the correct explanation is - whether merely circumstantial or a case of genuine contradiction. However, for a sceptic to ''prove'' the charge of contradiction, the onus is on him to eliminate all possible realistic explanations. The onus is not on the apologist to know which possible explanation is correct. By the same token, however, neither is it legitimate for the apologist to insist that any given explanation ''must'' be correct merely because it fits his or her preconceptions or has been argued by highly selective commentators with similar views. Indeed, the persistent citing of such commentators is liable to lead to an unresolvable 'battle of the commentators' that is likely to leave the general reader (who is in no position to judge the merits of the various commentators) just as nonplussed as before. True, the fact that there is a possible explanation means that the charge of contradiction may fail, depending on the inherent likelihood of the explanation. On the other hand, an unreasonably large number of not-very-likely or highly conjectural explanations may cast doubt on the apologist's case. | | Apologists might often disagree as to how an apparent contradiction is to be best explained, due to nobody knowing for sure what the correct explanation is - whether merely circumstantial or a case of genuine contradiction. However, for a sceptic to ''prove'' the charge of contradiction, the onus is on him to eliminate all possible realistic explanations. The onus is not on the apologist to know which possible explanation is correct. By the same token, however, neither is it legitimate for the apologist to insist that any given explanation ''must'' be correct merely because it fits his or her preconceptions or has been argued by highly selective commentators with similar views. Indeed, the persistent citing of such commentators is liable to lead to an unresolvable 'battle of the commentators' that is likely to leave the general reader (who is in no position to judge the merits of the various commentators) just as nonplussed as before. True, the fact that there is a possible explanation means that the charge of contradiction may fail, depending on the inherent likelihood of the explanation. On the other hand, an unreasonably large number of not-very-likely or highly conjectural explanations may cast doubt on the apologist's case. |
| − | Apologists might often disagree as to how an alleged contradiction is to be best explained, due to nobody knowing for sure what the correct explanation is - whether merely circumstantial or a case of genuine contradiction. However, for a sceptic to ''prove'' the charge of contradiction, the onus is on him to eliminate all possible realistic explanations. The onus is not on the apologist to know which possible explanation is correct. By the same token, however, neither is it legitimate for the apologist to insist that any given explanation ''must'' be correct merely because it fits his or her preconceptions or has been argued by highly selective commentators with similar views. Indeed, the persistent citing of such commentators is liable to lead to an unresolvable 'battle of the commentators' that is likely to leave the general reader (who is in no position to judge the merits of the various commentators) just as nonplussed as before. True, the fact that there is a possible explanation means that the charge of contradiction may fail, depending on the inherent likelihood of the explanation. On the other hand, an unreasonably large number of not-very-likely or highly conjectural explanations may cast doubt on the apologist's case.
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