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==Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma==

==Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma==

The Iterated Prisoner's dilemma is when the basic game is played multiple times (sometimes infinitely many times). Here, co-operation can be a Nash equilibrium. This requires that each player pays attention to what the other player does on previous "rounds", and punish or reward the other player as appropriate. The best known strategy in the Iterated Prisoner's dilemma is the "tit for tat" strategy. The "tit for tat" strategy is to cooperate the first time and then on all subsequent times the strategy is to do whatever the opponent did on the turn prior to the one you are on.

The Iterated Prisoner's dilemma is when the basic game is played multiple times (sometimes infinitely many times). Here, co-operation (neither player confessing) can be a Nash equilibrium. This requires that each player pays attention to what the other player does on previous "rounds", and punish or reward the other player as appropriate.  

 

The best known strategy in the Iterated Prisoner's dilemma is the "tit for tat" strategy. The "tit for tat" strategy is to cooperate the first time and then on all subsequent times the strategy is to do whatever the opponent did on the turn prior to the one you are on. In this game a prisoner will cooperate, because by doing so he ensures that the other player will cooperate in the next iteration. It is necessary that the game be played indefinitely for this strategy to foster cooperation. If not, players will deviate and confess in the last iteration, because there are no consequences, which will then remove the consequence from deviating in the second last iteration, followed by the third last, and so on, so both players confess immediately.

[[category:mathematics]]

[[category:mathematics]]

[[category:philosophy]]

[[category:philosophy]]