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| | __TOC__ | | __TOC__ |
| − | It was reported on February 24, 2011, that an emergency meeting of the [[United Nations Human Rights Council]] (UNHRC) on Libya would take no action, or make no recommendation to the [[UN General Assembly]], to remove Libya from its seat on the UN Human Rights Council, despite alleged [[human rights]] abuses.<ref>http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/no-threat-seen-libya-s-seat-top-un-human</ref> The [[United Nations Security Council]] (UNSC) then voted on March 17, 2011, to pass Security Council resolution 1973 proposed by [[France]], along with its British and Lebanese partners, initiating the use of military force in Libya. [[China]], [[Russia]], [[India]] and [[Brazil]] (the so-called BRIC nations) all abstained from the vote. The [[Obama administration]] called for Gaddafi to step aside, and has provided assistance to the insurgent forces. US Congressional leaders were not consulted, <ref>http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/262921/boehner-obama-libya-many-other-members-house-representatives-are-troubled-robert-costa</ref> nor has the United States Congress authorized any use of force in Libya. | + | It was reported on February 24, 2011, that an emergency meeting of the [[United Nations Human Rights Council]] (UNHRC) on Libya would take no action, or make no recommendation to the [[UN General Assembly]], to remove Libya from its seat on the UN Human Rights Council, despite alleged [[human rights]] abuses.<ref>http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/no-threat-seen-libya-s-seat-top-un-human</ref> The [[United Nations Security Council]] (UNSC) then voted on March 17, 2011, to pass Security Council resolution 1973 proposed by [[France]], along with its British and Lebanese partners, initiating the use of military force in Libya. [[China]], [[Russia]], [[India]] and [[Brazil]] (the so-called BRIC nations) all abstained from the vote. The [[Obama administration]] called for Gaddafi to step aside, and has provided assistance to the insurgent tribes. US Congressional leaders were not consulted, <ref>http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/262921/boehner-obama-libya-many-other-members-house-representatives-are-troubled-robert-costa</ref> nor has the United States Congress authorized any use of force in Libya. |
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| | Military and intelligence experts in France, [[Britain]], and the United States warned about uncertainties, but were overruled by political leaders. The result was a set of decisions focusing on short term considerations and gambling on the outcome. French, British, and US leaders did not fully coordinate, but according to Anthony Cordesman, it became clear, | | Military and intelligence experts in France, [[Britain]], and the United States warned about uncertainties, but were overruled by political leaders. The result was a set of decisions focusing on short term considerations and gambling on the outcome. French, British, and US leaders did not fully coordinate, but according to Anthony Cordesman, it became clear, |
| | {{Cquote|they sought and got international cover from the UN by claiming a no fly zone could protect civilians when their real objective was to use force as a catalyst to drive Gaddafi out of power.}} | | {{Cquote|they sought and got international cover from the UN by claiming a no fly zone could protect civilians when their real objective was to use force as a catalyst to drive Gaddafi out of power.}} |
| − | [[Sarkozy]], [[David Cameron|Cameron]], and [[Obama]] seem to have assumed that a largely unknown, divided, and fractured group of insurgents could win through sheer political momentum, and could then be turned into a successful government. Within the first month it was obvious a "weak, divided, poorly led, and badly equipped and supplied set of rebel forces can only hang on with the present level of air support" that was provided. | + | [[Sarkozy]], [[David Cameron|Cameron]], and [[Obama]] seem to have assumed that a largely unknown, divided, and fractured group of insurgents could win through sheer political momentum, and could then be turned into a successful government. Within the first month it was obvious a "weak, divided, poorly led, and badly equipped and supplied set of rebel tribes can only hang on with the present level of air support" that was provided. |
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| | The assault on Libya set off a frenzy of speculations about the real motive behind the war in the oil-rich country, with many analysts saying that under the guise of protecting civilians, as enshrined in the UNSC Resolution 1973, Washington and its Western allies are basically after the North African country’s vast oil reserves. <ref>[http://2012indyinfo.wordpress.com/2011/06/19/presstv-germany-slams-nato-mission-in-libya/ Germany slams NATO mission in Libya.]</ref> | | The assault on Libya set off a frenzy of speculations about the real motive behind the war in the oil-rich country, with many analysts saying that under the guise of protecting civilians, as enshrined in the UNSC Resolution 1973, Washington and its Western allies are basically after the North African country’s vast oil reserves. <ref>[http://2012indyinfo.wordpress.com/2011/06/19/presstv-germany-slams-nato-mission-in-libya/ Germany slams NATO mission in Libya.]</ref> |
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| | == National Transitional Council == | | == National Transitional Council == |
| | The National Transitional Council of the Libyan Republic announced its official establishment in early March 2011 in the city of Benghazi. The stated goal was to the overthrow of Mu’ammar Gaddafi.<ref>http://ntclibya.org/english/</ref> It has been recognized by France, [[Qatar]], Italy, [[Kuwait]], [[Maldives]] and [[Gambia]]. They have proceeded to form a transitional government for the post-Gaddafi era. Before forming a government, they robbed about $505 million from the Central Bank of Libya in Benghazi. | | The National Transitional Council of the Libyan Republic announced its official establishment in early March 2011 in the city of Benghazi. The stated goal was to the overthrow of Mu’ammar Gaddafi.<ref>http://ntclibya.org/english/</ref> It has been recognized by France, [[Qatar]], Italy, [[Kuwait]], [[Maldives]] and [[Gambia]]. They have proceeded to form a transitional government for the post-Gaddafi era. Before forming a government, they robbed about $505 million from the Central Bank of Libya in Benghazi. |
| − | [[File:Libya Rebels Gaining Momentum.jpg|thumb|Anti-Gaddafi forces in March, 2011 (Photo:Reuters).]] | + | [[File:Libya Rebels Gaining Momentum.jpg|thumb|Anti-Gaddafi tribal insurgents in March, 2011 (Photo:Reuters).]] |
| | {{Cquote|The top leaders of the “revolutionary” masses in Benghazi are two recent defectors of what the Left dubs Gaddafi’s “murderous regime”, Mustafa Abdul Jalil a former Justice minister (who prosecuted dissenters up to the day before the armed uprising), Mahmoud Jebril a top Gaddafite neo-liberal prominent in inviting multi-nationals to take over the oil fields (FT, March 23, 2011, p. 7) and Ali Aziz al-Eisawa, Gaddafi’s former ambassador to India who jumped ship when it looked like the uprising would succeed. These self-appointed leaders of the “rebels” are staunch backers of Euro-US military intervention just as they previously were long-term backers of Gaddafi’s dictatorship and promoters of MNC takeovers of oil and gas fields. The heads of the “rebels” military council is Omar Hariri and General Abdul Fattah Younis former head of the Ministry of Interior, both with long histories (since 1969) of repressing any democratic movements.<ref>http://alethonews.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/euro-us-war-on-libya-official-lies-and-misconceptions-of-critics/</ref>}} | | {{Cquote|The top leaders of the “revolutionary” masses in Benghazi are two recent defectors of what the Left dubs Gaddafi’s “murderous regime”, Mustafa Abdul Jalil a former Justice minister (who prosecuted dissenters up to the day before the armed uprising), Mahmoud Jebril a top Gaddafite neo-liberal prominent in inviting multi-nationals to take over the oil fields (FT, March 23, 2011, p. 7) and Ali Aziz al-Eisawa, Gaddafi’s former ambassador to India who jumped ship when it looked like the uprising would succeed. These self-appointed leaders of the “rebels” are staunch backers of Euro-US military intervention just as they previously were long-term backers of Gaddafi’s dictatorship and promoters of MNC takeovers of oil and gas fields. The heads of the “rebels” military council is Omar Hariri and General Abdul Fattah Younis former head of the Ministry of Interior, both with long histories (since 1969) of repressing any democratic movements.<ref>http://alethonews.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/euro-us-war-on-libya-official-lies-and-misconceptions-of-critics/</ref>}} |
| | The root base of the armed uprising is Benghazi, a hotbed of tribal backers and clients of the deposed King Idris. | | The root base of the armed uprising is Benghazi, a hotbed of tribal backers and clients of the deposed King Idris. |
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| | ===Insurgent Death Squads=== | | ===Insurgent Death Squads=== |
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| − | Rebel commanders created a wanted list and placed suspects under round-the-clock surveillance. Secret militia units raid houses without court warrants and often interrogate suspects for hours. Those released have to sign a document stating their loyalty to the revolution. As many as 30 civilians are being held at various rebel military bases around Benghazi without due process of law, said human rights activists, judges and prosecutors. In recent weeks, at least seven former members of the internal security police have turned up dead, their bodies riddled with bullets. Although it is not known who killed them, many suspect that they died at the hands of rebel-affiliated death squads. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libyan-rebels-accused-of-reprisal-attacks/2011/05/20/AFaeAh8G_story.html?hpid=z4]
| + | Insurgent tribal leaders created a wanted list and placed suspects under round-the-clock surveillance. Secret militia units raid houses without court warrants and often interrogate suspects for hours. Those released have to sign a document stating their loyalty to the revolution. As many as 30 civilians are being held at various rebel military bases around Benghazi without due process of law, said human rights activists, judges and prosecutors. In recent weeks, at least seven former members of the internal security police have turned up dead, their bodies riddled with bullets. Although it is not known who killed them, many suspect that they died at the hands of rebel-affiliated death squads. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libyan-rebels-accused-of-reprisal-attacks/2011/05/20/AFaeAh8G_story.html?hpid=z4] |
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| | On May, 26, the deputy leader of Libya's rebel administration said it could take up to two years to organize elections, backtracking on promises of a six-month transition to democracy. [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110526/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_libya] | | On May, 26, the deputy leader of Libya's rebel administration said it could take up to two years to organize elections, backtracking on promises of a six-month transition to democracy. [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110526/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_libya] |
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| | ==Mission creep== | | ==Mission creep== |
| − | UN Security Council Resolution 1973, passed in March 2011, does not authorise participating members to support the anti-Gaddafi forces, to defend armed groups, or to oust Gaddafi. Nor does it authorise a ground invasion or military occupation. Strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman notes the similarities between Libya and Iraq and the loose uncoordinated coalitions "failure to plan for the decisive and lasting use of force, failure to plan for the civil side of military operations and to support stability operations, and focus on short term goals without a realistic plan for a successful strategic and post-conflict outcome." Cordesman notes, | + | UN Security Council Resolution 1973, passed in March 2011, does not authorise participating members to support the anti-Gaddafi tribes, to defend armed groups, or to oust Gaddafi. Nor does it authorise a ground invasion or military occupation. Strategic analyst Anthony Cordesman notes the similarities between Libya and Iraq and the loose uncoordinated coalitions "failure to plan for the decisive and lasting use of force, failure to plan for the civil side of military operations and to support stability operations, and focus on short term goals without a realistic plan for a successful strategic and post-conflict outcome." Cordesman notes, |
| | {{Cquote|the lives and futures of some 6.6 million Libyans are at stake. The Franco-Anglo-American gamble now seems far too likely to fail at their expense. Moreover, it seems likely to drag the other nations that support the operation into their failure -- along with part of the reputation of NATO and credibility of the UN.... gambling on Qaddafi caving in has created a far more serious humanitarian crisis for the Libyan people than would ever have occurred if the Coalition had acted decisively from the start ...The humanitarian cost of humanitarian restraint is all too clear: Hundreds of Libyan and foreign workers have been killed...hundreds of thousands lack jobs, security, and safe conditions of life....an enduring war of attrition will turn a minor humanitarian crisis into a major one ...This kind of operation cannot be “surgical’ – if “surgical” now means minimizing bloodshed regardless of whether the patient dies. Hard, and sometimes brutal, choices need to be made between limited civilian casualties and collateral damage during the decisive use of force and an open-ended war of attrition that will produce far higher cumulative civilian casualties and collateral damage.<ref>http://csis.org/publication/libya-will-farce-stay-us-and-france-and-britain</ref>}} | | {{Cquote|the lives and futures of some 6.6 million Libyans are at stake. The Franco-Anglo-American gamble now seems far too likely to fail at their expense. Moreover, it seems likely to drag the other nations that support the operation into their failure -- along with part of the reputation of NATO and credibility of the UN.... gambling on Qaddafi caving in has created a far more serious humanitarian crisis for the Libyan people than would ever have occurred if the Coalition had acted decisively from the start ...The humanitarian cost of humanitarian restraint is all too clear: Hundreds of Libyan and foreign workers have been killed...hundreds of thousands lack jobs, security, and safe conditions of life....an enduring war of attrition will turn a minor humanitarian crisis into a major one ...This kind of operation cannot be “surgical’ – if “surgical” now means minimizing bloodshed regardless of whether the patient dies. Hard, and sometimes brutal, choices need to be made between limited civilian casualties and collateral damage during the decisive use of force and an open-ended war of attrition that will produce far higher cumulative civilian casualties and collateral damage.<ref>http://csis.org/publication/libya-will-farce-stay-us-and-france-and-britain</ref>}} |
| | Cordesman notes mission creep and boots on the ground ultimately lead to [[nation building]]: | | Cordesman notes mission creep and boots on the ground ultimately lead to [[nation building]]: |
| | {{Cquote|France, Britain, and the US now have a special obligation to both finish what they started in military terms, and deal with the aftermath. A post-conflict Libya will need extensive help in building a workable political system, in rebuilding the capability to govern, in both rebuilding the existing economy and correcting for decades of Qaddafi’s reckless and constantly shifting eccentricities.}} | | {{Cquote|France, Britain, and the US now have a special obligation to both finish what they started in military terms, and deal with the aftermath. A post-conflict Libya will need extensive help in building a workable political system, in rebuilding the capability to govern, in both rebuilding the existing economy and correcting for decades of Qaddafi’s reckless and constantly shifting eccentricities.}} |
| | On April 19, 2011, one month after Sarkozy, Cameron, and Obama asked the UN Security Council for authorization for a limited use of force, the UK ''[[Guardian (UK)|Guardian]]'' reported, | | On April 19, 2011, one month after Sarkozy, Cameron, and Obama asked the UN Security Council for authorization for a limited use of force, the UK ''[[Guardian (UK)|Guardian]]'' reported, |
| − | {{Cquote|Britain is now publicly doing what it expressly said it would not do when the no-fly intervention began: putting boots on the ground in Libya. France is taking similar action. Given that the rebel forces have convincingly demonstrated their inability to win on their own, given the sizable negatives for David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy of an open-ended, inconclusive conflict, and given Barack Obama's flat refusal to do any more, the question now is: how many more British and French boots will follow, sooner or later, in the advisers' fateful footsteps?....By encouraging and assisting rebel resistance, as [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush Snr]] did with the [[Shia]]s of southern [[Iraq]] in 1991, Britain and France risk worsening the plight of the Libyan civilians they are primarily pledged to defend. The UN and concerned aid agencies all agree the humanitarian situation is growing steadily worse, the longer the conflict continues. ..<ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/19/libya-mission-military-advisory-team</ref>}} | + | {{Cquote|Britain is now publicly doing what it expressly said it would not do when the no-fly intervention began: putting boots on the ground in Libya. France is taking similar action. Given that the rebel tribes have convincingly demonstrated their inability to win on their own, given the sizable negatives for David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy of an open-ended, inconclusive conflict, and given Barack Obama's flat refusal to do any more, the question now is: how many more British and French boots will follow, sooner or later, in the advisers' fateful footsteps?....By encouraging and assisting rebel resistance, as [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush Snr]] did with the [[Shia]]s of southern [[Iraq]] in 1991, Britain and France risk worsening the plight of the Libyan civilians they are primarily pledged to defend. The UN and concerned aid agencies all agree the humanitarian situation is growing steadily worse, the longer the conflict continues. ..<ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/19/libya-mission-military-advisory-team</ref>}} |
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| | <blockquote> | | <blockquote> |