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→Other secret agreements
====Other secret agreements====
====Other secret agreements====
Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> The President would be dead in less than a month; this agreement would not be disclosed for another two years.<ref>Michael Kort, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=xAnwfRnsl6oC The Columbia Guide to the Cold War]'' (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) ISBN 0231107730, p. 179</ref>
Another secret agreement<ref>According to Hiss, the agreement to give the Soviets three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. “was not put in the [[#refYalta45|communiqué]]" containing the public Yalta agreement. It was, he said, an "oral agreement ... that the Russians would bring their two delegations [''sic''—actually three delegations—the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Byelorussia] to [the UN Charter Conference in] San Francisco, propose them for admission [to the United Nations], and we [the United States] would agree. But it would not be announced in advance.” [[#refYUNHiss|YUN 1990]]: 18 (PDF 19)</ref> gave the [[Soviet Union]] three votes in the UN to one for the U.S. Later urging [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] to tell the [[U.S.]] delegation to the UN founding conference "the whole truth" about this agreement (which he called "this X-matter"), Stettinius would advise [[FDR]] to have Hiss with him when he broke the news to the [[American]] delegates.<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 305-306</ref> The President would be dead within a month; this agreement would not be disclosed for another two years.<ref>Michael Kort, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=xAnwfRnsl6oC The Columbia Guide to the Cold War]'' (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) ISBN 0231107730, p. 179</ref>
According to [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/byrnes-james-francis James F. Byrnes], then director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, he and others returned from Yalta to Washington on February 10, but Roosevelt stayed behind with a select few—including Hiss:
According to [http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/byrnes-james-francis James F. Byrnes], then director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, he and others returned from Yalta to Washington on February 10, but Roosevelt stayed behind with a select few—including Hiss: