Changes

Three quarters down the page at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ it says:

Three quarters down the page at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ it says:

::Kant observes that there is no intrinsic difference between the concept of a hundred real thalers (coins common in Kant's time) and the concept of a hundred possible thalers. Whenever we think of anything, we regard it as existing, even if the thing in question does not actually exist. Thus, existence does not add anything to the concept of a thing.

::'Kant observes that there is no intrinsic difference between the concept of a hundred real thalers (coins common in Kant's time) and the concept of a hundred possible thalers. Whenever we think of anything, we regard it as existing, even if the thing in question does not actually exist. Thus, existence does not add anything to the concept of a thing.'

I say yes-and-no to that final statement, since the statement is a formal version of a logical oversimplification regarding 'things' (some things are necessary fictions, such as that '2+2=5', and, unless God is a necessary fiction, then there is, in fact, some intellectual traction in the substance of the ontological argument). First, the ideas both of ‘existence’ and of ‘necessary existence’ do add to the material, effectual concept of ‘God’, in that the idea of existence and necessary existence must be subtracted---and arbitrarily so---from any one or more of the material, effectual attributes of the concept of ‘God’. For example, while the existence of power does not add to the effectual nature of power, in that power, rather than power’s existence, is that which effects other material things, power cannot not exist without requiring that any other material thing not exist (whatever exists has some power, and whatever necessarily exists has/is a necessary power). Second, actual existence does not pertain necessarily to an arbitrary fiction such as a half-elephant-half-mouse. Third, actual existence necessarily does not pertain to a necessary fiction such as a ‘purple verb’ or the equation of ‘2+2=5’.  

I say yes-and-no to the final statement in that quote, since the statement is a formal version of a logical oversimplification regarding 'things' (some things are direct, first-order necessary fictions such as that '2+2=5', and some things are indirect, second-order necessary fictions such as that 'the Earth is flat like a waffle'; so, unless God is direct, first-order necessary fiction, then there is, in fact, some intellectual traction in the substance of the ontological argument). '''First''', the ideas both of ‘existence’ and of ‘necessary existence’ do add to the material, effectual concept of ‘God’, in that the idea of ''necessary existence'' (and, thus, ''existence'') must be subtracted---and arbitrarily so---from any one or more of the material, effectual attributes of the concept of ‘God’. For example, while the existence of power does not add to the effectual nature of power, in that power, rather than power’s 'existence', is that which effects other material things, power cannot not exist without requiring that any other material thing not exist (whatever exists has some power, and whatever necessarily exists has/is a necessary power). '''Second''', actual existence does not pertain necessarily to an arbitrary fiction such as a half-elephant-half-mouse. Third, actual existence '''''necessarily does not''''' pertain to a necessary fiction such as a ‘purple verb’ or the equation of ‘2+2=5’.  

The concept of God is unique in that: a) it is not a necessary fiction, b) it is not an arbitrary fiction, c) it is not an arbitrary possibility like things that are already known to exist, such as a hundred-thalers-currently-in-your-purse. In other words, if God does NOT actually exist as a material object, but is merely an idea of the mind, then the problem is from what does that idea come?

The concept of God is unique in that: a) it is not a direct necessary fiction, b) it is not an arbitrary fiction, c) it is not an arbitrary possibility (like things that are already known to exist, such as a hundred-thalers-currently-in-your-purse). In other words, if God does ''not'' actually exist as a material object, but is merely an idea of the mind, then the problem is from what does that idea come?

Is the concept of God a contingency of some more basic concepts? If not, and, if, according to atheists, God (nevertheless) is a necessary fiction...

Is the concept of God a contingency of some more basic concepts? If not, and, if, according to atheists, God (nevertheless) is a necessary fiction...