{{cquote|In 1988, [[Erol Ricketts]] and [[Isabel Sawhill]] proposed a conceptual definition of the underclass and then produced some of the first empirical estimates of the size of the underclass using available [[census|census data]]. A number of journalists, such as [[Ken Auletta]] and [[Leon Dash]], who had written about the underclass emphasized that it was not just about low [[income]], but also about [[destructive behavior|destructive]] or [[anti-social behavior]]s. When Ricketts and Sawhill considered which behaviors to focus on they chose four. To have a shot at the [[American dream]], they argued, you needed to stay in school at least through high school; you needed to not [[illegitimacy|have a baby before you were married]] or prepared to [[support a child]]; you needed to work or [[job hunting|actively seek work]]; and you needed to be law-abiding. This is what most Americans expect other Americans to do. If you are poor, despite doing all of these things, then you are not part of the underclass and have a reasonable chance of making it, especially if provided with an appropriate set of social supports. But if you fail to behave in accordance with this set of [[norm|societal norms]], you are less deserving of social assistance and could be considered part of the underclass. <ref>[http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2006/01poverty_jargowsky.aspx]</ref>}}
{{cquote|In 1988, [[Erol Ricketts]] and [[Isabel Sawhill]] proposed a conceptual definition of the underclass and then produced some of the first empirical estimates of the size of the underclass using available [[census|census data]]. A number of journalists, such as [[Ken Auletta]] and [[Leon Dash]], who had written about the underclass emphasized that it was not just about low [[income]], but also about [[destructive behavior|destructive]] or [[anti-social behavior]]s. When Ricketts and Sawhill considered which behaviors to focus on they chose four. To have a shot at the [[American dream]], they argued, you needed to stay in school at least through high school; you needed to not [[illegitimacy|have a baby before you were married]] or prepared to [[support a child]]; you needed to work or [[job hunting|actively seek work]]; and you needed to be law-abiding. This is what most Americans expect other Americans to do. If you are poor, despite doing all of these things, then you are not part of the underclass and have a reasonable chance of making it, especially if provided with an appropriate set of social supports. But if you fail to behave in accordance with this set of [[norm|societal norms]], you are less deserving of social assistance and could be considered part of the underclass. <ref>[http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2006/01poverty_jargowsky.aspx]</ref>}}
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Some scholars also note that religious belief plays a large role in economic mobility, with strong Christian families leaving poverty at a rate far exceeding that of atheist families in similar socioeconomic strata. It is speculated that the strong emphasis on hard work, sacrifice and honesty in the New Testament plays a role in this difference. The fundamental reason, however, lies in the difference between the atheistic and Christian worldviews. Atheists view misfortune as the product of an uncaring, random universe, too vast for a puny human to ever affect. There is no incentive, therefore, for an atheist to attempt to change the hand that their purely deterministic universe has death them. If they are poor, it is because their atoms were in the wrong place at the wrong time during the Big Bang. Christian thought, on the other hand, emphasizes that all things, good and bad, come from God, and that hard work and sincere prayer can change the world in ways that science cannot measure or understand. A Christian is more likely to persevere in the face of even overwhelming odds because of the power of faith. This perseverance is the factor which allows believers to rise out of poverty and prosper where atheists merely wallow in it.
Conservative scholars note that the effect of big-government policies toward the poor has historically been to dampen the consequences of disregarding these common-sense regulations. Welfare expansion and the popularization of premarital sex, both goals of leftist political thought, have served to increase both the size and inertia of this underclass by removing the incentive to improve oneself and make responsible decisions. The ultimate effect of this trend is that a large portion of this generation have come to rely not on themselves, but on a political party and its bloated organs for sustenance.
Conservative scholars note that the effect of big-government policies toward the poor has historically been to dampen the consequences of disregarding these common-sense regulations. Welfare expansion and the popularization of premarital sex, both goals of leftist political thought, have served to increase both the size and inertia of this underclass by removing the incentive to improve oneself and make responsible decisions. The ultimate effect of this trend is that a large portion of this generation have come to rely not on themselves, but on a political party and its bloated organs for sustenance.