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For limited sentient agents, abstraction is the neurological function of allocating the least possible explicit knowledge of, and, hence, the least neurological energy to, the correspondence between the abstraction and that from which the abstraction is abstracted. In other words, for the sentient creature, thoughts and ideas, including the process of forming ideas from percepts, is a matter of efficiency in the use of limited active cognitive resources.

For limited sentient agents, abstraction is the neurological function of allocating the least possible explicit knowledge of, and, hence, the least neurological energy to, the correspondence between the abstraction and that from which the abstraction is abstracted. In other words, for the sentient creature, thoughts and ideas, including the process of forming ideas from percepts, is a matter of efficiency in the use of limited active cognitive resources.

But, in so far as a given depth of ''a priori'' knowledge requires little, if any, cognitive energy to apply either to practical concepts or to empirical pursuits, such ''a priori'' knowledge is ignored or forgotten in the subconscious, even to the extent that, upon being consciously introduced to it through various words and their emotional baggage, it is not recognized as ''a priori'' In such an event, it is then easily viewed as useless, trivial, or even arbitrary. This means that, for the most ''a priori'' kind of knowledge, it is difficult to prove to most people, not because they lack it, but because it is only so subtly possessed in face of so many other, far more more energy-intensive, and promising, concerns.

But, in so far as a given depth of ''a priori'' knowledge requires little, if any, cognitive energy to apply either to practical concepts or to empirical pursuits, such ''a priori'' knowledge is ignored or forgotten in the subconscious. In some cases, it is so forgotten that, upon being consciously introduced to it through various words and their socio-emotional baggage, it is not recognized as ''a priori''.  In such an event, it is then easily viewed as useless, trivial, or even arbitrary. This means that, for the most ''a priori'' kind of knowledge, it is difficult to prove it to be so to most people, not because they lack it, but because it is only so subtly possessed in the first place in face of so many other, far more more energy-intensive, and promising, concerns.

So, in regard to the most ''a priori'' knowledge, people can easily position themselves skeptically in regard to it: in face of empirical knowledge, and the ease of progress and reward in the relative mastery of the empirical, deduction can so easily be construed as to seem not to have any native (''a priori'') content. And, if someone is determined that, in effect, deduction has no native content, then the only kind of reasoning by which someone of a deeply different metaphysics can seem credible to such a person is the reasoning about everyday material things and their supposed ontological primacy.

So, in regard to the most ''a priori'' knowledge, people can easily position themselves skeptically in regard to it: in face of empirical knowledge, and the ease of progress and reward in the relative mastery of the empirical realm, deduction can so easily be construed as to seem not to have any native (''a priori'') content, or, if it does, it is only trivial content. And, if someone is determined that, in effect, deduction has no native content, then the only kind of reasoning by which someone of a deeply different metaphysics can seem credible to such a person is if the reasoning is about everyday material things and their supposed ontological primacy.

[[Category:Epistemology]]

[[Category:Epistemology]]