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:In classical terms, this is to broach the problem of theodicy: how to think about God in the face of the presence of suffering in God's creation. After God's dethronement as the subject of history, the question rebounds to the new subject of history: the human being. As a consequence, theodicy becomes anthropodicy — justifications of our faith in humanity as the subject of history, in the face of the suffering that is so inextricably woven into the history that humanity makes. Mutatis mutandis, the universe story brings with it the need for a "cosmodicy." How do we think about the presence of suffering, on a massive scale, in the story of the cosmos, particularly when the cosmos itself is understood to be the subject of history? How do we justify our faith in the cosmos?<ref>J. Matthew Ashley, "Reading the universe story theologically: the contribution of a biblical narrative imagination", ''Theological studies'', 2010, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 870-902</ref>

:In classical terms, this is to broach the problem of theodicy: how to think about God in the face of the presence of suffering in God's creation. After God's dethronement as the subject of history, the question rebounds to the new subject of history: the human being. As a consequence, theodicy becomes anthropodicy — justifications of our faith in humanity as the subject of history, in the face of the suffering that is so inextricably woven into the history that humanity makes. Mutatis mutandis, the universe story brings with it the need for a "cosmodicy." How do we think about the presence of suffering, on a massive scale, in the story of the cosmos, particularly when the cosmos itself is understood to be the subject of history? How do we justify our faith in the cosmos?<ref>J. Matthew Ashley, "Reading the universe story theologically: the contribution of a biblical narrative imagination", ''Theological studies'', 2010, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 870-902</ref>

So, the depth to which we try to objectify our existential experience of evil is merely a reflection of the depth to which we hold the good and the rational to be at once objective and transcendent.

So, the depth to which we try to objectify our existential experience of evil is merely a reflection of the depth to which we hold the good and the rational to be at once objective and transcendent. Atheists who object to God's typical inaction with regard to human conflict and human plight feel that if God was truly good and truly omnipotent, then God would be stepping in every time injustice is done to one person or group by another. But, many atheists who think this way reject the reality of [[original sin]], in that they have an extremely high, if tacit, opinion of themselves as good people: as essentially, context-transcending-ly moral. But, in fact, no descendent of Adam is essentially more moral than the worst known tyrants in history, else we must explain their tyranny as the product of an essentially lesser and immoral kind of being which merely ''looks'' human. No very tyrant in history was born practicing the evils he is known for. Every tyrant-in-waiting will, if the opportunities fully allow it, strive for his own peace to the detriment of his fellows. This means that no descendent of Adam is as good as he thinks he is during his days of being the underdog. Lack of opportunity to succeed tyrannically in our own selfish interests means only that we tend to focus on how we may best survive by being good. This is what gives us a sense that we are essentially better than murderous tyrants, when, in fact, we are not.

 

== References ==

== References ==