| − | During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to Stettinius, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss's role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction—a policy that Acheson would subsequently use as a pretext to obstruct aid to China<ref>After failing to get aid to China cut off officially, Acheson would instruct his subordinates in 1949 that "it is desirable that shipments be delayed where possible to do so without formal action." (David S. McLellan, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SfJ2AAAAMAAJ Dean Acheson: the State Department years]'' [New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976] ISBN 0396073131, p. 188) After the fall of China, Senator John F. Kennedy would comment: "Mr. Speaker, over this weekend we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the [Truman] White House and the [Acheson] Department of State. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the [[Owen Lattimore|Lattimore]]s and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the democratic system in China after twenty years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China." John F. Kennedy, ''A Compendium of Speeches, Statements, and Remarks Delivered During His Service in the Congress of the United States'' (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 41-42. Cf. [[#refEvans07|Evans 2007]]: 419</ref>—a move that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref> | + | During pre-conference negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, regarding the war with Japan, "Mr. Hiss brought up the question of China," according to the State Department's formerly Top Secret minutes, "and stressed the importance which the United States attaches to U.S.-British-Soviet encouragement and support for an agreement between the [[Comintern|Commintern]] [sic] and the Chinese Congress [sic]."<ref>[[#refStettinius75|Stettinius 1975]]: 229. The official State Department record uses the passive voice to expunge Hiss's role in this maneuver: "The desirability of unity being achieved between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Communists]] was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity." Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., on Board H. M. S. "Sirius" in Grand Harbor. [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&isize=XL&submit=Go+to+page&page=502 502] Press accounts relying on this bowdlerized official account thus reported, e.g.: "Alger Hiss, whose role at the Yalta conference long has been a subject for hostile speculation, spent his time there [http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40C11F6345A107A93CAA81788D85F418585F9 exclusively on planning for the United Nations]."</ref> The British, due to their interests in Hong Kong and Singapore, had influence with the [[Kuomintang]], but none with the [[Communists]]; the Soviets, who did have influence with the Communists, were not present (because they were [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/smenu.asp not at war with Japan]). The only effect Hiss had in bringing up the issue therefore was to co-opt the British to pressure the Chinese government into acquiescing to a [[Kremlin]]-backed power-sharing arrangement with the rebels, thus granting a measure of legitimacy to forces dedicated to its destruction—a policy that Acheson would subsequently use as a pretext to obstruct aid to China<ref>After failing to get aid to China cut off officially, Acheson would instruct his subordinates in 1949 that "it is desirable that shipments be delayed where possible to do so without formal action." (David S. McLellan, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SfJ2AAAAMAAJ Dean Acheson: the State Department years]'' [New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976] ISBN 0396073131, p. 188) After the fall of China, Senator John F. Kennedy would comment: "Mr. Speaker, over this weekend we have learned the extent of the disaster that has befallen China and the United States. The responsibility for the failure of our foreign policy in the Far East rests squarely with the [Truman] White House and the [Acheson] Department of State. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed, was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the [[Owen Lattimore|Lattimore]]s and the Fairbanks, with the imperfection of the democratic system in China after twenty years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China." John F. Kennedy, ''A Compendium of Speeches, Statements, and Remarks Delivered During His Service in the Congress of the United States'' (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 41-42. Cf. [[#refEvans07|Evans 2007]]: 419</ref>—a move that would prove [http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles5/RummelDemocide.php catastrophic for the Chinese].<ref>After the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, Communist Chinese dictator Mao Zedong "was responsible for [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1069136,00.html well over 70 million] deaths in peacetime, more than any other 20th-century leader," according to Jung Chang, a former [http://chineseculture.about.com/od/mediainchina/p/Writer-Jung-Chang.htm member of Mao's Red Guards]. [[#refChang05|Chang 2005]]: 3, 560, 651. Cf. Stephane Courtois et al., ''[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674076082 The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression]'' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) ISBN 9780674076082, p. 4.</ref> |
| | Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest,<ref>Laura Tyson Li, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tnbMSIL077wC Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady]'' (Open City Books, 2006) ISBN 0871139332, p. 267</ref> alleging the existence of a "Communist conspiracy within the State Department."<ref>Don Lohbeck, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=eJ44AAAAIAAJ Patrick J. Hurley]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1956), p. 447</ref> Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944 [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists], I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref> | | Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest,<ref>Laura Tyson Li, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=tnbMSIL077wC Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady]'' (Open City Books, 2006) ISBN 0871139332, p. 267</ref> alleging the existence of a "Communist conspiracy within the State Department."<ref>Don Lohbeck, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=eJ44AAAAIAAJ Patrick J. Hurley]'' (H. Regnery Co., 1956), p. 447</ref> Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944 [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists], I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref> |