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| | The Pro-Choice movement likes to say that women should have a right to one's body. However, such a right should logically not allow one to harm others with that body, including physical assault, murder, rape, or theft. As Hugh V. McLachlan of Glasgow Caledonian University pointed out in 1997, there is no entitlement to one's body and "we have rights duties, liabilities, restrictions and | | The Pro-Choice movement likes to say that women should have a right to one's body. However, such a right should logically not allow one to harm others with that body, including physical assault, murder, rape, or theft. As Hugh V. McLachlan of Glasgow Caledonian University pointed out in 1997, there is no entitlement to one's body and "we have rights duties, liabilities, restrictions and |
| | disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies." {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so." | | disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies." {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so." |
| − | -Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}} | + | -Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref name=mclachlan>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}} |
| | + | As McLachlan continues to point out, this emphasis on rights neglects the other side of the coin, responsibilities or duties. He gives on pg. 177 the example of an insurance policy, and how using one's body to commit suicide can invalidate such a contract.<ref name=mclachlan /> Logically, creating another human life should likewise bring responsibly for actions toward that life - how is the decision to create another human life of lesser importance than the decision to sign an insurance contract? Why should one be able to kill a separate person to void the sexual decision to bring about another life, yet not be able to kill oneself and thus void an insurance contract? |
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| | + | Ultimately, the real question is whether the fetus is in question another human being to be accorded unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness under the Declaration of Independence, for if so, no right to one's body should give power to infringe on its unalienable right to life. The real question is at what point a fetus becomes a human being. |
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| | ==History== | | ==History== |