| − | The Pro-Choice movement likes to say that women should have a right to one's body. However, such a right should logically not allow one to harm others with that body, including physical assault, murder, rape, or theft. As Hugh V. McLachlan of Glasgow Caledonian University pointed out in 1997, there is no entitlement to one's body and "we have rights duties, liabilities, restrictions and | + | The Pro-Choice movement likes to say that women should have a right to their bodies. However, such a right should logically not allow one to harm others with that body, including physical assault, murder, rape, or theft, and therefore, this is not an absolute right, but a privilege that is not intended to exceed another's unalienable rights, including the right to life. As Hugh V. McLachlan of Glasgow Caledonian University pointed out in 1997, there is no entitlement to one's body and "we have rights duties, liabilities, restrictions and |
| | disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies." {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so." | | disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies." {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so." |
| | -Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref name=mclachlan>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}} | | -Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref name=mclachlan>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}} |