Changes

===Right to One's Body===

===Right to One's Body===

The Pro-Choice movement likes to say that women should have a right to their bodies. However, such a right should logically not allow one to harm others with that body, including physical assault, murder, rape, or theft, and therefore, this is not an absolute right, but a privilege that is not intended to exceed another's unalienable rights, including the right to life. As Hugh V. McLachlan of Glasgow Caledonian University pointed out in 1997, there is no entitlement to one's body and "we have rights duties, liabilities, restrictions and

The Pro-Choice movement likes to say that women should have a right to their bodies. However, such a right should logically not allow one to harm others with that body, including physical assault, murder, rape, or theft, and therefore, this is not an absolute right, but a privilege that is not intended to exceed another's unalienable rights, including the right to life. As Hugh V. McLachlan of ''Glasgow Caledonian University'' pointed out in 1997, there is no entitlement to one's body and "''we have rights duties, liabilities, restrictions and

disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies." {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so."

disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies.''" {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so."

-Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref name=mclachlan>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}}

-Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref name=mclachlan>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}}

As McLachlan continues to point out, this emphasis on rights neglects the other side of the coin, responsibilities or duties. He gives on pg. 177 the example of an insurance policy, and how using one's body to commit suicide can invalidate such a contract.<ref name=mclachlan /> Logically, creating another human life should likewise bring responsibly for actions toward that life - how is the decision to create another human life of lesser importance than the decision to sign an insurance contract? Why should one be able to kill a separate person to void the sexual decision to bring about another life, yet not be able to kill oneself and thus void an insurance contract? {{cquote|"Certainly a woman has a right to control her own body, but the unborn entity, though for a time living inside her body, is not part of her body. Hence, abortion is not justified, since no one's right to personal autonomy is so strong that it permits the arbitrary execution of others."

As McLachlan continues to point out, this emphasis on rights neglects the other side of the coin, responsibilities or duties. He gives on pg. 177 the example of an insurance policy, and how using one's body to commit suicide can invalidate such a contract.<ref name=mclachlan /> Logically, creating another human life should likewise bring responsibly for actions toward that life - how is the decision to create another human life of lesser importance than the decision to sign an insurance contract? Why should one be able to kill a separate person to void the sexual decision to bring about another life, yet not be able to kill oneself and thus void an insurance contract? {{cquote|"Certainly a woman has a right to control her own body, but the unborn entity, though for a time living inside her body, is not part of her body. Hence, abortion is not justified, since no one's right to personal autonomy is so strong that it permits the arbitrary execution of others."