Changes

===Right to Privacy===

===Right to Privacy===

To get abortion legalized, the Pro-Choice movement had to argue that women should have a "right to privacy".<ref>Levin, M.R. (2005, March 14). [http://old.nationalreview.com/levin/levin200503140754.asp Death by Privacy]. ''The National Review''.</ref> However, logically, if the fetus is a human being and thus murder would be committed, privacy is no excuse for such murder. Logically, killing someone in the privacy of one's own home should no more be an excuse for murder than killing them in the privacy of one's body. Furthermore, as Justice Friendly pointed out in the nation's first major abortion case, [[Hall v. Lefkowitz]], abortion is actually a complete violation of privacy when you look at it, requiring intervention in a woman's most private areas by a physician and variety of medical personnel.

To get abortion legalized, the Pro-Choice movement had to argue that women should have a "right to privacy".<ref>Levin, M.R. (2005, March 14). [http://old.nationalreview.com/levin/levin200503140754.asp Death by Privacy]. ''The National Review''.</ref> However, logically, if the fetus is a human being and thus murder would be committed, privacy is no excuse for such murder. Logically, killing someone in the privacy of one's own home should no more be an excuse for murder than killing them in the privacy of one's body. Furthermore, as Judge Henry J. Friendly pointed out in the nation's first major abortion case, [[Hall v. Lefkowitz]], abortion is actually a complete violation of privacy when you look at it, requiring intervention in a woman's most private areas by a physician and variety of medical personnel.

{{cquote|A holding that the privacy of sexual intercourse is protected against governmental intrusion scarcely carries as a corollary that when this has resulted in conception, government may not forbid destruction of the fetus. The type of abortion the plaintiffs particularly wish to protect against governmental sanction is the antithesis of privacy. The woman consents to intervention in the uterus by a physician, with the usual retinue of assistants, nurses, and other paramedical personnel, indeed the condition calling for such intervention may very likely have been established by clinical tests... Yet, even if we were to take plaintiffs’ legal position that the legislature cannot constitutionally interfere with a woman’s right to do as she will with her own body so long as no harm is done to others, the argument does not support the conclusion plaintiffs would have us draw from it. For we cannot say the New York legislature lacked a rational basis for considering that abortion causes such harm. Even if we should put aside the interests of the father, negligible indeed in the many cases when he has abandoned the prospective mother but not in all, the legislature could permissibly consider the fetus itself to deserve protection.<ref name=friendly>Randolph, A. Raymond. [http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/jlpp/Vol29_No3_Randolph.pdf Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly's Draft Abortion Opinion]. ''Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy''. Vol. 29.</ref>}}

{{cquote|A holding that the privacy of sexual intercourse is protected against governmental intrusion scarcely carries as a corollary that when this has resulted in conception, government may not forbid destruction of the fetus. The type of abortion the plaintiffs particularly wish to protect against governmental sanction is the antithesis of privacy. The woman consents to intervention in the uterus by a physician, with the usual retinue of assistants, nurses, and other paramedical personnel, indeed the condition calling for such intervention may very likely have been established by clinical tests... Yet, even if we were to take plaintiffs’ legal position that the legislature cannot constitutionally interfere with a woman’s right to do as she will with her own body so long as no harm is done to others, the argument does not support the conclusion plaintiffs would have us draw from it. For we cannot say the New York legislature lacked a rational basis for considering that abortion causes such harm. Even if we should put aside the interests of the father, negligible indeed in the many cases when he has abandoned the prospective mother but not in all, the legislature could permissibly consider the fetus itself to deserve protection.<ref name=friendly>Randolph, A. Raymond. [http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/jlpp/Vol29_No3_Randolph.pdf Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly's Draft Abortion Opinion]. ''Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy''. Vol. 29.</ref>}}