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| | disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies.''" {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so." | | disadvantages as well as rights concerning our own bodies.''" {{cquote|"Consider the assumption at issue in the abstract: 'That particular X is your X and, therefore, you are entitled to do what you want with it'. As a matter of pure logic, the claim is an absurdity. What if 'X' stands for a Thompson Machine Gun? Should we say: 'That is your machine gun and, therefore, you can do whatever you like with it?' On the contrary, although there might be some things which you and only you can of right do to and with the gun, if that particular machine gun is your machine gun then it is incumbent upon you in particular to ensure that certain things are not done with it. Is the situation any different when 'X' pertains to one's body or to parts of it? I do not think so." |
| | -Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref name=mclachlan>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}} | | -Hugh V. McLachlan, ''Glasgow Caledonian University''.<ref name=mclachlan>McLachlan, H.V. (1997). [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377347/ Bodies, Rights, and Abortions]. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 23. p. 176.</ref>}} |
| − | As McLachlan continues to point out, this emphasis on rights neglects the other side of the coin, responsibilities or duties. He gives on pg. 177 the example of an insurance policy, and how using one's body to commit suicide can invalidate such a contract.<ref name=mclachlan /> Logically, creating another human life should likewise bring responsibly for actions toward that life - how is the decision to create another human life of lesser importance than the decision to sign an insurance contract? Why should one be able to kill a separate person to void the sexual decision to bring about another life, yet not be able to kill oneself and thus void an insurance contract? {{cquote|"Certainly a woman has a right to control her own body, but the unborn entity, though for a time living inside her body, is not part of her body. Hence, abortion is not justified, since no one's right to personal autonomy is so strong that it permits the arbitrary execution of others." | + | As McLachlan continues to point out, this emphasis on rights neglects the other side of the coin, responsibilities or duties. He gives on pg. 177 the example of an insurance policy, and how using one's body to commit suicide can invalidate such a contract.<ref name=mclachlan /> Logically, creating another human life should likewise bring responsibly for actions toward that life - how is the decision to create another human life of lesser importance than the decision to sign an insurance contract? Why should one be able to kill a separate person to void the sexual decision to bring about another life, yet not be able to kill oneself without voiding an insurance contract? {{cquote|"Certainly a woman has a right to control her own body, but the unborn entity, though for a time living inside her body, is not part of her body. Hence, abortion is not justified, since no one's right to personal autonomy is so strong that it permits the arbitrary execution of others." |
| | -Francis J. Beckwith, ''Christian Research Journal''.<ref>Beckwith, F.J. (1991). [https://christiananswers.net/q-sum/q-life009.html Doesn't a woman have the right to control her own body?] ''Christian Research Journal''. At ''ChristianAnswers.net''.</ref>}}Ultimately, the real question is whether the fetus in question is another human being to be accorded unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness under the Declaration of Independence, for if so, no right to one's body should give power to infringe on its unalienable right to life. Your right to your body does not include the right, in other words, to kill others using that body to avoid the responsibilities and consequences of a sexual decision to create another life. That is what in the real world is called "murder" and it is reprehensible. Therefore, the real question is at what point a fetus becomes a human being. | | -Francis J. Beckwith, ''Christian Research Journal''.<ref>Beckwith, F.J. (1991). [https://christiananswers.net/q-sum/q-life009.html Doesn't a woman have the right to control her own body?] ''Christian Research Journal''. At ''ChristianAnswers.net''.</ref>}}Ultimately, the real question is whether the fetus in question is another human being to be accorded unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness under the Declaration of Independence, for if so, no right to one's body should give power to infringe on its unalienable right to life. Your right to your body does not include the right, in other words, to kill others using that body to avoid the responsibilities and consequences of a sexual decision to create another life. That is what in the real world is called "murder" and it is reprehensible. Therefore, the real question is at what point a fetus becomes a human being. |
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| | ===Right to Privacy=== | | ===Right to Privacy=== |
| | To get abortion legalized, the Pro-Choice movement had to argue that women should have a "right to privacy".<ref>Levin, M.R. (2005, March 14). [http://old.nationalreview.com/levin/levin200503140754.asp Death by Privacy]. ''The National Review''.</ref> However, logically, if the fetus is a human being and thus murder would be committed, privacy is no excuse for such murder. Logically, killing someone in the privacy of one's own home should no more be an excuse for murder than killing them in the privacy of one's body. Furthermore, as Judge Henry J. Friendly pointed out in the nation's first major abortion case, [[Hall v. Lefkowitz]], abortion is actually a complete violation of privacy when you look at it, requiring intervention in a woman's most private areas by a physician and variety of medical personnel. | | To get abortion legalized, the Pro-Choice movement had to argue that women should have a "right to privacy".<ref>Levin, M.R. (2005, March 14). [http://old.nationalreview.com/levin/levin200503140754.asp Death by Privacy]. ''The National Review''.</ref> However, logically, if the fetus is a human being and thus murder would be committed, privacy is no excuse for such murder. Logically, killing someone in the privacy of one's own home should no more be an excuse for murder than killing them in the privacy of one's body. Furthermore, as Judge Henry J. Friendly pointed out in the nation's first major abortion case, [[Hall v. Lefkowitz]], abortion is actually a complete violation of privacy when you look at it, requiring intervention in a woman's most private areas by a physician and variety of medical personnel. |