Difference between revisions of "Ministerial exception"
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''[[Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School]]'', No. 22-1440, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11330, at *22-23 (4th Cir. May 8, 2024) (Harris, J., joined by Niemeyer, J.). | ''[[Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School]]'', No. 22-1440, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11330, at *22-23 (4th Cir. May 8, 2024) (Harris, J., joined by Niemeyer, J.). | ||
| + | == Non-waivable, but only applicable to religiously related entities == | ||
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| + | {{cquote|Although the Funeral Home has not waived the ministerial-exception defense by failing to raise it, see Conlon, 777 F.3d at 836 (holding that private parties may not "waive the First Amendment's ministerial exception" because "[t]his constitutional protection is ... structural"), we agree with the Funeral Home that the exception is inapplicable here. | ||
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| + | As we made clear in Conlon, the ministerial exception applies only to "religious institution[s]." Id. at 833. While an institution need not be "a church, diocese, or synagogue, or an entity operated by a traditional religious organization," id. at 834 (quoting Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225), to qualify for the exception, the institution must be "marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics," id. at 834 (quoting Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004)). In accordance with these principles, we have previously determined that the InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA ("IVCF"), "an evangelical campus mission," constituted a religious organization for the purposes of the ministerial exception. See id. at 831, 833. IVCF described itself on its website as "faith-based religious organization" whose "purpose 'is to establish and advance at colleges and universities witnessing communities of students and faculty who follow Jesus as Savior and Lord.'" Id. at 831 (citation omitted). In addition, IVCF's website notified potential employees that it has the right to "hir[e] staff based on their religious beliefs so that all staff share the same religious commitment." Id. (citation omitted). Finally, IVCF required all employees "annually [to] reaffirm their agreement with IVCF's Purpose Statement and Doctrinal Basis." Id.}} | ||
| + | ''EEOC v. R.G.'', 884 F.3d 560, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2018). | ||
== References == | == References == | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist}} | ||
[[Category:Ministerial exception]] | [[Category:Ministerial exception]] | ||
Revision as of 17:08, May 11, 2024
The ministerial exception was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) and expanded in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
As explained by the Fourth Circuit in May 2024:
| “ | [A]lthough "Hosanna-Tabor "clarified that the exception is a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4, neither case cast doubt on the exception's structural basis, or its importance in partitioning civil authorities from religious ones. Indeed, in both decisions, the Supreme Court plainly adopted the structural understanding of the ministerial exception: The First Amendment's Religion Clauses, the Court explained, "bar the government from interfering" with ministerial employment decisions or involving itself in ecclesiastical matters. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181, 189. That means civil courts like ours are "bound to stay out" of employment disputes involving ministers - those "holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions." Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060. [footnote 4: The term "minister" is shorthand for somebody who qualifies for the ministerial exception. We are mindful that the title of the exception made it into the case law only "because the individuals involved in pioneering cases were described as 'ministers,'" and not because the title - with its independent religious significance - governs the legal analysis. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060; see also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 202 (Alito, J., concurring); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000).]
Relying on its structural nature, some courts consider the ministerial exception categorically non-waivable. See Conlon, 777 F.3d at 836; Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1042; see also Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int'l, 36 F.4th 1021, 1052 (10th Cir. 2022) (Bacharach, J., dissenting).[1] |
” |
Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, No. 22-1440, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11330, at *22-23 (4th Cir. May 8, 2024) (Harris, J., joined by Niemeyer, J.).
| “ | Although the Funeral Home has not waived the ministerial-exception defense by failing to raise it, see Conlon, 777 F.3d at 836 (holding that private parties may not "waive the First Amendment's ministerial exception" because "[t]his constitutional protection is ... structural"), we agree with the Funeral Home that the exception is inapplicable here.
As we made clear in Conlon, the ministerial exception applies only to "religious institution[s]." Id. at 833. While an institution need not be "a church, diocese, or synagogue, or an entity operated by a traditional religious organization," id. at 834 (quoting Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225), to qualify for the exception, the institution must be "marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics," id. at 834 (quoting Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004)). In accordance with these principles, we have previously determined that the InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA ("IVCF"), "an evangelical campus mission," constituted a religious organization for the purposes of the ministerial exception. See id. at 831, 833. IVCF described itself on its website as "faith-based religious organization" whose "purpose 'is to establish and advance at colleges and universities witnessing communities of students and faculty who follow Jesus as Savior and Lord.'" Id. at 831 (citation omitted). In addition, IVCF's website notified potential employees that it has the right to "hir[e] staff based on their religious beliefs so that all staff share the same religious commitment." Id. (citation omitted). Finally, IVCF required all employees "annually [to] reaffirm their agreement with IVCF's Purpose Statement and Doctrinal Basis." Id. |
” |
EEOC v. R.G., 884 F.3d 560, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2018).
