Difference between revisions of "FACA"

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(However, FACA does not establish a private cause of action)
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"FACA clearly requires agency heads at least to consider whether new restraints on committee membership might inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such restraints when they do so."  ''Union of Concerned Scientists v. Wheeler'', 954 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2020).  However, FACA does not establish a private cause of action:
 
"FACA clearly requires agency heads at least to consider whether new restraints on committee membership might inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such restraints when they do so."  ''Union of Concerned Scientists v. Wheeler'', 954 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2020).  However, FACA does not establish a private cause of action:
 
{{cquote|FACA clearly requires agency heads at least to consider whether new restraints on committee membership might inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such restraints when they do so.}}
 
{{cquote|FACA clearly requires agency heads at least to consider whether new restraints on committee membership might inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such restraints when they do so.}}
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<br>''Union of Concerned Scientists v. Wheeler'', 954 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2020).
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''Union of Concerned Scientists v. Wheeler'', 954 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2020).
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In that [[First Circuit]] decision, Appellants asserted that an EPA "directive violates FACA's fair balance provision (Count III); the directive violates FACA's inappropriate influence provision (Count IV); and the EPA offered no rational explanation for adopting the directive, especially given that it changed prior policy (Count I)."  ''Id.'' at 17.
  
 
== References ==
 
== References ==

Revision as of 04:39, May 21, 2022

The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) is a federal law requiring a high degree of transparency for governmental committees that include non-government workers, if they advise agencies or the president.

Enacted in 1972, FACA supposedly ensures that advice by such committees be objective and transparent to the public. FACA created the Committee Management Secretariat to oversee compliance, and in 1976, Executive Order 12024 delegated from the president to the administrator of GSA all presidential responsibilities for FACA implementation.[1]

A total of 308 reported decisions -- 300 of which are in federal rather than state court -- discussed FACA as of May 20, 2022. Only two U.S. Supreme Court decisions have addressed FACA: Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (FACA not apply to ABA committee advising on nominations by the president to the federal judiciary) and Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004) (even if "FACA's statutory objectives would be to some extent frustrated, it does not follow that a court's Article III authority or Congress' central Article I powers would be impaired"). A total of 73 of the FACA decisions have been by a federal court of appeals, 46 of which have been by the D.C. Circuit.

Fair balance and no inappropriate influence

"FACA clearly requires agency heads at least to consider whether new restraints on committee membership might inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such restraints when they do so." Union of Concerned Scientists v. Wheeler, 954 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2020). However, FACA does not establish a private cause of action:

“ FACA clearly requires agency heads at least to consider whether new restraints on committee membership might inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such restraints when they do so. ”

Union of Concerned Scientists v. Wheeler, 954 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2020).

In that First Circuit decision, Appellants asserted that an EPA "directive violates FACA's fair balance provision (Count III); the directive violates FACA's inappropriate influence provision (Count IV); and the EPA offered no rational explanation for adopting the directive, especially given that it changed prior policy (Count I)." Id. at 17.

References