Difference between revisions of "History of Poland"

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=== First World War aftermath ===
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{{See also|Republic of Poland}}
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After the [[World War I|First World War]], Poland regained independence after [[Partitions of Poland|123 years of partitions]]. While the victorious Western allies proclaimed their support for an independent Poland, they primarily wanted to weaken [[Germany]] and the Soviet Union. As a result, their actual support was limited. One instance was the affair of [[Silesia]]. Many French and British politicians desired the industrial region of Silesia to remain part of Germany, so that Germany would have an easier time paying the Great War reparations to France and its allies. Britain provided no aid to Poland during the 1921 Silesian Uprisings. Under the terms of the [[Treaty of Versailles]], a plebiscite was to be held to determine which areas of ethnically mixed Silesia were to be ceded to Poland and which were to remain with Germany. In some districts of Upper Silesia, the majority of the people were Polish and opted for Poland; the majority in the rest of Upper Silesia opted for Germany. After the plebiscite, the Germans balked at handing over any part of Upper Silesia, claiming that the Versailles treaty did not call for partitioning Silesia by districts. The German interpretation was that the majority of people in Silesia had chosen Germany and so all of Silesia should remain with Germany. The German view was supported by Britain. In fact, Versailles did clearly state that Upper Silesia was to be partitioned by districts after the plebiscite.<ref name="Butler"> {{cite book | author =various authors | coauthors = | title =Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939 | year =1961 (1974) | editor =[[Rohan Butler]], J.P.T. Bury, M.E. Lambert | pages = | chapter =Upper Silesia, Poland, and the Baltic States, January 1920–March 1921 <333| chapterurl = | series=1st | volume=XI | publisher =[[Her Majesty's Stationary Office]] | location =London | id =ISBN 0-11-591511-7 | url = | format = | accessdate = }}</ref><ref name="Jędruszczak"> {{cite book | author =[[Tadeusz Jędruszczak]] | title =Plebiscyt i trzecie powstanie śląskie | series = Historia Polski | volume = IV | year =1984 | editor = | pages = | publisher =[[Polish Academy of Sciences]] | location =Warsaw | id =ISBN 83-01-003865-9 }}</ref>
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However, France and the French military in Silesia generally took a pro-Polish stance during the 1921 Polish uprising. In the years immediately after World War One, it was French policy to weaken Germany as much as possible, and though the French did not champion the border that the Poles wanted in Silesia, the French attitude to the Polish cause in regard to the Silesian dispute was markedly pro-Polish and anti-German. Indeed, it was a ultimatum from [[Paris]] that compelled the Germans to withdraw their forces from Silesia in June 1921.
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Ostensibly, the British view that all of Silesia ought to remain with Germany was based on the belief that it would allow Germany to more easily pay reparations to France; by 1921, London had largely abandoned any claims against Germany and was strongly pressuring both France and Belgium to lower their reparations claims against the Germans as much as possible. The British argument about reparations was mostly a bid to influence French public opinion; the real reason for London's pro-German stance was the belief that if Germany were to lose too much territory, this could undermine the fragile [[Weimar Republic]] and lead to extremists taking power in Germany. Thus, British policy towards Silesia in 1921 was largely motivated by the desire to consolidate German democracy. Though the British were prepared to support an interpretation of Versailles that violated both its letter and its spirit, and though the Poles were understandably angry with London’s pro-German view in this matter, it is very hard to refer to British refusal to support the Polish rebels in Silesia as a “betrayal” as Britain had never made any commitments to do so.   
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During the [[Polish-Soviet War]] (1918-1921), there was a debate among western politicians which side they should support: the [[White Army|White Russians]] monarchists (representing the former [[Imperial Russia]] loyalists), the new [[Bolshevik]] revolutionaries, or newly independent countries trying to expand their territory at the expense of the powers that lost the First World War. Eventually, France and Britain decided to support the White Russians and Poland; however, their support to Poland was limited to the few hundred soldiers of the [[French Military Mission to Poland|French military mission]]. Further, when it seemed likely in early 1920 that Poland would lose the war (which did not happen), Western diplomats encouraged Poland to surrender and settle for large territorial losses (the [[Curzon line]]).
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In July 1920, Britain announced it would send huge quantities of World War One surplus military supplies to Poland, but a threatened general strike by the Trades Union Congress who objected to British support of "White Poland" ensured that none of the weapons that were supposed to go to Poland went any further than British ports. The British Prime Minister [[David Lloyd George]] had never been enthusiastic about supporting the Poles, and had been pressured by his more right-wing Cabinet members such as Lord Curzon and [[Winston Churchill]] into offering the supplies. The threatened general strike was for Lloyd George a convenient excuse for backing out of his commitments. The French were hampered in their efforts to supply Poland by the refusal of [[Danzig]] (modern [[Gdańsk]], Poland) dockworkers to unload supplies for Poland. Likewise, French efforts to supply Poland via land were hindered by the refusal of Czechoslovakia and Germany (both which had border disputes with Poland) to allow arms for Poland to cross their frontiers.
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In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). With the rise of [[Nazism]] in Germany, this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between [[France]], [[United Kingdom|Britain]], and [[Poland]] (Franco-Polish Alliance and Anglo-Polish Alliance). This agreement stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked<ref name="Ajnenkiel"> {{cite book | author =[[Andrzej Ajnenkiel]] | title =Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy | year =2000 | editor = | pages = | chapter = | chapterurl = | publisher =[[Academy of National Defence|Akademia Obrony Narodowej]] | location =Warsaw | id = | url = | format = | accessdate = }}</ref><ref name="Ciałowicz"> {{cite book | author =Jan Ciałowicz | coauthors = | title =Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy, 1921–1939 | year =1971 | editor = | pages = | chapter = | chapterurl = | publisher =[[Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN|Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe]] | location =Warsaw | id = }}</ref><ref name="Raczyński">{{cite book | author =Count [[Edward Raczyński (1891–1993)|Edward Raczyński]] | title =The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning | year =1948 | editor = | pages = | chapter = | chapterurl = | publisher =The Mellville Press | location =London | id = }}</ref>
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==References==
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{{reflist}}
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==External link==
 
==External link==
 
*[https://www.bitchute.com/video/UfI5UEiTpavL/ VOLHYNIA. NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS] - DOCUMENTARY DISCUSSING UKRAINIAN MASSACRE OF POLES (ENG SUBS)
 
*[https://www.bitchute.com/video/UfI5UEiTpavL/ VOLHYNIA. NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS] - DOCUMENTARY DISCUSSING UKRAINIAN MASSACRE OF POLES (ENG SUBS)

Revision as of 11:00, November 30, 2022

First World War aftermath

See also: Republic of Poland

After the First World War, Poland regained independence after 123 years of partitions. While the victorious Western allies proclaimed their support for an independent Poland, they primarily wanted to weaken Germany and the Soviet Union. As a result, their actual support was limited. One instance was the affair of Silesia. Many French and British politicians desired the industrial region of Silesia to remain part of Germany, so that Germany would have an easier time paying the Great War reparations to France and its allies. Britain provided no aid to Poland during the 1921 Silesian Uprisings. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, a plebiscite was to be held to determine which areas of ethnically mixed Silesia were to be ceded to Poland and which were to remain with Germany. In some districts of Upper Silesia, the majority of the people were Polish and opted for Poland; the majority in the rest of Upper Silesia opted for Germany. After the plebiscite, the Germans balked at handing over any part of Upper Silesia, claiming that the Versailles treaty did not call for partitioning Silesia by districts. The German interpretation was that the majority of people in Silesia had chosen Germany and so all of Silesia should remain with Germany. The German view was supported by Britain. In fact, Versailles did clearly state that Upper Silesia was to be partitioned by districts after the plebiscite.[1][2]

However, France and the French military in Silesia generally took a pro-Polish stance during the 1921 Polish uprising. In the years immediately after World War One, it was French policy to weaken Germany as much as possible, and though the French did not champion the border that the Poles wanted in Silesia, the French attitude to the Polish cause in regard to the Silesian dispute was markedly pro-Polish and anti-German. Indeed, it was a ultimatum from Paris that compelled the Germans to withdraw their forces from Silesia in June 1921.

Ostensibly, the British view that all of Silesia ought to remain with Germany was based on the belief that it would allow Germany to more easily pay reparations to France; by 1921, London had largely abandoned any claims against Germany and was strongly pressuring both France and Belgium to lower their reparations claims against the Germans as much as possible. The British argument about reparations was mostly a bid to influence French public opinion; the real reason for London's pro-German stance was the belief that if Germany were to lose too much territory, this could undermine the fragile Weimar Republic and lead to extremists taking power in Germany. Thus, British policy towards Silesia in 1921 was largely motivated by the desire to consolidate German democracy. Though the British were prepared to support an interpretation of Versailles that violated both its letter and its spirit, and though the Poles were understandably angry with London’s pro-German view in this matter, it is very hard to refer to British refusal to support the Polish rebels in Silesia as a “betrayal” as Britain had never made any commitments to do so.

During the Polish-Soviet War (1918-1921), there was a debate among western politicians which side they should support: the White Russians monarchists (representing the former Imperial Russia loyalists), the new Bolshevik revolutionaries, or newly independent countries trying to expand their territory at the expense of the powers that lost the First World War. Eventually, France and Britain decided to support the White Russians and Poland; however, their support to Poland was limited to the few hundred soldiers of the French military mission. Further, when it seemed likely in early 1920 that Poland would lose the war (which did not happen), Western diplomats encouraged Poland to surrender and settle for large territorial losses (the Curzon line).

In July 1920, Britain announced it would send huge quantities of World War One surplus military supplies to Poland, but a threatened general strike by the Trades Union Congress who objected to British support of "White Poland" ensured that none of the weapons that were supposed to go to Poland went any further than British ports. The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George had never been enthusiastic about supporting the Poles, and had been pressured by his more right-wing Cabinet members such as Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill into offering the supplies. The threatened general strike was for Lloyd George a convenient excuse for backing out of his commitments. The French were hampered in their efforts to supply Poland by the refusal of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) dockworkers to unload supplies for Poland. Likewise, French efforts to supply Poland via land were hindered by the refusal of Czechoslovakia and Germany (both which had border disputes with Poland) to allow arms for Poland to cross their frontiers.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). With the rise of Nazism in Germany, this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between France, Britain, and Poland (Franco-Polish Alliance and Anglo-Polish Alliance). This agreement stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked[3][4][5]

References

  1. ↑ various authors (1961 (1974)). "Upper Silesia, Poland, and the Baltic States, January 1920–March 1921 <333", in Rohan Butler, J.P.T. Bury, M.E. Lambert: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 1st. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office. ISBN 0-11-591511-7. 
  2. ↑ Tadeusz Jędruszczak (1984). Plebiscyt i trzecie powstanie śląskie, Historia Polski. Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences. ISBN 83-01-003865-9. 
  3. ↑ Andrzej Ajnenkiel (2000). Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy. Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej. 
  4. ↑ Jan Ciałowicz (1971). Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy, 1921–1939. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. 
  5. ↑ Count Edward Raczyński (1948). The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning. London: The Mellville Press. 

External link