Changes

:''NYT'' today: "Russia has managed to overcome sanctions and export controls imposed by [[the West]] to expand its [[missile]] production beyond prewar levels, according to U.S., European and Ukrainian officials, leaving Ukraine especially vulnerable to intensified attacks in the coming months”. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]^{[[User talk:RobSmith|''Give Peace a Chance!'']]} 22:28, September 13, 2023 (EDT)

:''NYT'' today: "Russia has managed to overcome sanctions and export controls imposed by [[the West]] to expand its [[missile]] production beyond prewar levels, according to U.S., European and Ukrainian officials, leaving Ukraine especially vulnerable to intensified attacks in the coming months”. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]^{[[User talk:RobSmith|''Give Peace a Chance!'']]} 22:28, September 13, 2023 (EDT)

::I think the true test will come when China's economy starts having bigger problems and orders less oil from Russia. See: [[Essay: A Chinese economic collapse will be Russia's downfall]]

::I think the true test will come when China's economy starts having bigger problems and orders less oil from Russia and this seems likely. See: [[Essay: A Chinese economic collapse will be Russia's downfall]]

::Also, "China’s slumping economy is likely curbing many of its foreign policy ambitions and prompting a rethink of its policy toward the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Still, a systematic transformation of Beijing’s perspective on Ukraine or other key foreign policy matters is unlikely. Xi shares Moscow’s anti-Western hostility; demonstrates a very shaky grasp of economics, limiting his understanding of the scope of China’s domestic problems; and presides over a system that does not make major self-corrections easily. Xi may dial back China’s pro-Russia neutrality, but only reluctantly and partially."[https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/will-a-china-led-global-recession-influence-beijings-russia-policy/]

::Also, "China’s slumping economy is likely curbing many of its foreign policy ambitions and prompting a rethink of its policy toward the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Still, a systematic transformation of Beijing’s perspective on Ukraine or other key foreign policy matters is unlikely. Xi shares Moscow’s anti-Western hostility; demonstrates a very shaky grasp of economics, limiting his understanding of the scope of China’s domestic problems; and presides over a system that does not make major self-corrections easily. Xi may dial back China’s pro-Russia neutrality, but only reluctantly and partially."[https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/will-a-china-led-global-recession-influence-beijings-russia-policy/]