Difference between revisions of "Economy of Russia"
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[[File:Flag of Russia.png|right|thumbnail|250px|The flag of [[Russia]] ]] | [[File:Flag of Russia.png|right|thumbnail|250px|The flag of [[Russia]] ]] | ||
Russian [[GDP]] nominally rose more than any [[G7]] country in 2023. The average Russian household ended the year with about 18% more money in the [[bank]] than a year earlier. Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-controlled bank, posted a 5.5-fold year-on-year net profit jump to a record high of 1.5 trillion rubles (USD $16.3 billion). The defense industry employs 3.5 million people and many factories have doubled their workforce since the beginning of the [[SMO]]. The economic boom is result of defense [[stimulus]] spending, [[Keynesian economics]], a government [[deficit]]s. Compared to the [[United States]], Russia is a piker in the debt markets. The U.S. gas $35 trillion [[national debt]] and growing), nearly a $1 trillion dollar defense budget, does not produce tanks, failed to produce a functional [[hypersonic missile]], incapable of matching Russia’s output of [[artillery]] shells, and has become largely a service economy. | Russian [[GDP]] nominally rose more than any [[G7]] country in 2023. The average Russian household ended the year with about 18% more money in the [[bank]] than a year earlier. Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-controlled bank, posted a 5.5-fold year-on-year net profit jump to a record high of 1.5 trillion rubles (USD $16.3 billion). The defense industry employs 3.5 million people and many factories have doubled their workforce since the beginning of the [[SMO]]. The economic boom is result of defense [[stimulus]] spending, [[Keynesian economics]], a government [[deficit]]s. Compared to the [[United States]], Russia is a piker in the debt markets. The U.S. gas $35 trillion [[national debt]] and growing), nearly a $1 trillion dollar defense budget, does not produce tanks, failed to produce a functional [[hypersonic missile]], incapable of matching Russia’s output of [[artillery]] shells, and has become largely a service economy. | ||
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| + | == Russia's labor crisis == | ||
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| + | ''See also:'' [[Russia's labor crisis]] | ||
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| + | The Center for European Policy Analysis reported on March 9, 2024: | ||
| + | {{Cquote|Towards the end of last year, experts from the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences estimated that [[Russia]] faced a shortfall of nearly 5 million workers in 2023, which is already impeding economic growth. The total workforce is a little under 74 million. | ||
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| + | With perhaps a million Russians, including many working-age men, having fled the country, with more than 300,000 dead or wounded in Ukraine, with more than a million men in the military, and a fertility rate of 1.5 — far below the so-called replacement rate of 2.1 — the country simply cannot meet its needs. | ||
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| + | The head of the Central Bank is among those describing it as the country’s most serious problem, hardly surprising when unemployment is just 2.9% and the vacancy rate is 6.8%. | ||
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| + | This scarcity is particularly pronounced in the manufacturing, construction, and transportation sectors. According to recruitment agencies and company management, the workforce deficit will worsen in 2024. | ||
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| + | Beyond skilled professionals, Russia struggles to meet even basic labor demands, including those for military purposes. Increasingly, schoolchildren and students are being enlisted for war-related tasks. Just last week, a major investigation revealed how minors as young as 14 are involved in activities for the “Mayor’s Labor Unit” in Krasnoyarsk, weaving camouflage nets and preparing parcels for frontline needs.<ref>[https://cepa.org/article/russia-seeks-africans-to-fix-its-workforce-shortages/ Russia Seeks Africans to Fix its Workforce Shortages], Center for European Policy Analysis, March 9, 2024</ref>}} | ||
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== Russia's business environment == | == Russia's business environment == | ||
Revision as of 22:43, April 10, 2024
Russian GDP nominally rose more than any G7 country in 2023. The average Russian household ended the year with about 18% more money in the bank than a year earlier. Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-controlled bank, posted a 5.5-fold year-on-year net profit jump to a record high of 1.5 trillion rubles (USD $16.3 billion). The defense industry employs 3.5 million people and many factories have doubled their workforce since the beginning of the SMO. The economic boom is result of defense stimulus spending, Keynesian economics, a government deficits. Compared to the United States, Russia is a piker in the debt markets. The U.S. gas $35 trillion national debt and growing), nearly a $1 trillion dollar defense budget, does not produce tanks, failed to produce a functional hypersonic missile, incapable of matching Russia’s output of artillery shells, and has become largely a service economy.
Russia's labor crisis
See also: Russia's labor crisis
The Center for European Policy Analysis reported on March 9, 2024:
| “ | Towards the end of last year, experts from the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences estimated that Russia faced a shortfall of nearly 5 million workers in 2023, which is already impeding economic growth. The total workforce is a little under 74 million.
With perhaps a million Russians, including many working-age men, having fled the country, with more than 300,000 dead or wounded in Ukraine, with more than a million men in the military, and a fertility rate of 1.5 — far below the so-called replacement rate of 2.1 — the country simply cannot meet its needs. The head of the Central Bank is among those describing it as the country’s most serious problem, hardly surprising when unemployment is just 2.9% and the vacancy rate is 6.8%. This scarcity is particularly pronounced in the manufacturing, construction, and transportation sectors. According to recruitment agencies and company management, the workforce deficit will worsen in 2024. Beyond skilled professionals, Russia struggles to meet even basic labor demands, including those for military purposes. Increasingly, schoolchildren and students are being enlisted for war-related tasks. Just last week, a major investigation revealed how minors as young as 14 are involved in activities for the “Mayor’s Labor Unit” in Krasnoyarsk, weaving camouflage nets and preparing parcels for frontline needs.[1] |
” |
Russia's business environment
The Kennan Institute indicates concerning Russia:
| “ | Albats suggested that democracy should be viewed as a commodity that needs to have buyers. In order for democracy to develop in Russia, there must be a class of "consumers of democratic politics," consisting primarily of people involved in small and medium businesses. Unfortunately, Albats warned, this constituency is in decline in Russia. The number of people employed in small and medium business has declined from a peak of 8.9 million in 1995 to only 6.3 million in 2001. At the same time, the proportion of bureaucrats relative to the population has been increasing: In the last days of the Soviet Union, there was one bureaucrat for every 75.6 citizens, and in Russia today there is one bureaucrat for every 49.6 citizens.
Thriving in a system rife with corruption and little accountability, Soviet-trained bureaucrats have stifled the growth of small businesses in Russia, according to Albats. She noted that the majority of regulations existing in Russia today were issued not by the Duma or the President, but by various state agencies—between 1991 and 2001, Russian federal ministries imposed 1474 regulations on business, compared with 156 passed by the legislature. Albats contended that bureaucrats find it easier to control several large businesses than many small businesses, and have set up a regulatory framework to reflect that preference.[2] |
” |
References
- ↑ Russia Seeks Africans to Fix its Workforce Shortages, Center for European Policy Analysis, March 9, 2024
- ↑ Bureaucrats and Russian Transition: The Politics of Accommodation