Difference between revisions of "Maneuver warfare"
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While all the major [[European]] continental armies spent the 1930’s thinking deeply about armored warfare and doctrinal concepts, the [[US Army]] had no armored force at all, and the simple field regulations issued to officers had nothing to say about the matter. | While all the major [[European]] continental armies spent the 1930’s thinking deeply about armored warfare and doctrinal concepts, the [[US Army]] had no armored force at all, and the simple field regulations issued to officers had nothing to say about the matter. | ||
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== See also == | == See also == | ||
Latest revision as of 19:32, February 26, 2025
Maneuver warfare involves attacking key elements of an enemies fighting resources (Command and control elements, logistical support, fire support, etc.) and is frequently combined with isolation of the forces being attacked.
The skillful use of maneuver warfare can result in a smaller military forces prevailing over much larger forces. Napoleon Bonaparte and Sun Tzu are well-known examples of military strategist/leaders skillfully using maneuver warfare with great effect.
While all the major European continental armies spent the 1930’s thinking deeply about armored warfare and doctrinal concepts, the US Army had no armored force at all, and the simple field regulations issued to officers had nothing to say about the matter.