Difference between revisions of "Leapfrogging (military strategy)"
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| + | [[File:Macarthur1.jpg|thumbnail|right|250px|General [[Douglas MacArthur]] used the military strategy of leapfrogging in the [[World War II#Pacific War (Far East)|Pacific War]] in [[World War II]]. | ||
| + | <br /> | ||
| + | <br /> | ||
| + | "The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off...”. - General Douglas MacArthur.]] | ||
According to the digital education website Lumen learning: | According to the digital education website Lumen learning: | ||
| − | {{Cquote|Leapfrogging” was the Allied strategy of bypassing and isolating fortified positions by focusing on strategically important islands. | + | {{Cquote|Leapfrogging” was the [[Allied Powers|Allied]] strategy of bypassing and isolating fortified positions by focusing on strategically important islands. |
Key Points: | Key Points: | ||
| − | *Leapfrogging was a military strategy that entailed bypassing and isolating heavily fortified | + | *Leapfrogging was a military strategy that entailed bypassing and isolating heavily fortified [[Japan]]ese positions while preparing to take over strategically important islands. It originated from island hopping. The strategy of not attacking strategically unimportant locations is an ancient strategy. The military strategist [[Sun Tzu]] wrote: "Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical." |
*Island hopping entailed taking over an island and establishing a military base there. The base was in turn used as a launching point for the attack and takeover of another island. | *Island hopping entailed taking over an island and establishing a military base there. The base was in turn used as a launching point for the attack and takeover of another island. | ||
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*Leapfrogging was based on both seaborne and air attacks to blockade and isolate Japanese bases, weakening their garrisons and reducing the Japanese ability to resupply and reinforce them. | *Leapfrogging was based on both seaborne and air attacks to blockade and isolate Japanese bases, weakening their garrisons and reducing the Japanese ability to resupply and reinforce them. | ||
| − | *Leapfrogging would allow U.S. forces to reach Japan more quickly and not expend the time, manpower, and supplies to capture every Japanese-held island on the way. It would also give the Allies the advantage of surprise and keep the Japanese off balance.<ref>[https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-ushistory/chapter/the-war-in-the-pacific/ The War in the Pacific: Leapfrogging to Tokyo], lumenlearning.com]</ref> | + | *Leapfrogging would allow U.S. forces to reach Japan more quickly and not expend the time, manpower, and supplies to capture every Japanese-held island on the way. It would also give the Allies the advantage of surprise and keep the Japanese off balance.<ref>[https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-ushistory/chapter/the-war-in-the-pacific/ The War in the Pacific: Leapfrogging to Tokyo], lumenlearning.com</ref>}} |
| + | [[Image:Midway Atoll.jpg|thumb|200px|left|Midway [[Atoll]], as it looked in November, 1941]] | ||
| + | According to the website Weapons and Warfare: | ||
| + | {{Cquote|Advancing in either the southwest [[Pacific Ocean|Pacific]] or the central Pacific after the [[Battle of Midway]] in June 1942 required the Allies to attain several objectives. First, the U.S. Pacific Fleet needed to keep the Japanese Combined Fleet in check, if not totally destroy it. Second, Allied [[air superiority]] had to be established and maintained with both land- and carrier-based aircraft. Third, Allied forces needed to carry out repeated large-scale amphibious assaults. Finally, rolling back the Japanese forces meant attacking a strategic defense-in-depth in the Pacific, where island chains potentially served as mutually supporting bases of operations. To reach all these overlapping objectives, the Allies employed “island-hopping” and “leap-frogging” strategies to maximize limited resources, shorten time, and reduce casualties. | ||
| + | |||
| + | In theory, island-hopping made sense as a solution to cracking an island-based defense-in-depth. This strategy can be understood in the following example. | ||
| + | |||
| + | U.S. amphibious and naval forces successfully subdue a Japanese island base, X. In the following month or two, fresh troops replace the exhausted assault forces and crush any stubborn Japanese resistance. Then this island is used as a staging point for assaulting the next enemy-held island, Y. Seabees and army engineers speedily repair or construct airfields and dredge harbors as Allied forces mass for the next leg of the campaign. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Island X serves as air base, safe anchorage, and supply depot for the men and materiel being ferried from [[Australia]] or [[Hawaii]]. Fresh marine and army divisions receive their last-minute training before their amphibious assault on island Y with support from naval forces and aircraft based on island X. This strategy was employed during the Solomons campaign and later at [[Iwo Jima]] and [[Battle of Okinawa|Okinawa]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Island-hopping proved to be a strategic necessity early in the [[World War II#Pacific War (Far East)|Pacific war]]. As 1942 drew to a close and 1943 began, the Allies could muster only limited carrier strength because of losses around [[Guadalcanal]]. At one point in October 1942, USS Enterprise was the only operational aircraft carrier in the theater, and it desperately needed an overhaul. Until the new Essex-class carriers became operational, amphibious attacks could not be supported beyond the range of land-based aircraft. Consequently, hopping from island to island under cover of aircraft from nearby bases was the only practical option.<ref>[https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2016/03/29/island-hopping-and-leap-frogging-u-s-strategies-part-i/ Island-Hopping and Leap-frogging, U.S. Strategies Part I]</ref>}} | ||
| + | |||
| + | == Related books == | ||
| + | |||
| + | *Asada, Sadao (2006), ''From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States'', Annapolis, Maryland, USA: Naval Institute Press. ISBN-10: 1557500428 | ||
| + | |||
| + | *''Island Hopping across the Pacific Theater in World War II: The History of America’s Victorious Leapfrogging Strategy against Imperial Japan'', Publisher: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform (November 23, 2017), ISBN-10: 9781979992800 | ||
| + | == See also == | ||
| + | |||
| + | *[[List of military strategies and concepts]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | == External links == | ||
| + | |||
| + | *[https://warhistory.org/@msw/article/island-hopping-and-leap-frogging-u-s-strategies-part-i Island-Hopping and Leap-frogging, U.S. Strategies], Warhistory.org | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==References== | ||
| + | {{Reflist}} | ||
| + | [[Category: Military]] | ||
Latest revision as of 22:21, July 25, 2025
"The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off...”. - General Douglas MacArthur.
According to the digital education website Lumen learning:
| “ | Leapfrogging” was the Allied strategy of bypassing and isolating fortified positions by focusing on strategically important islands.
Key Points:
|
” |
According to the website Weapons and Warfare:
| “ | Advancing in either the southwest Pacific or the central Pacific after the Battle of Midway in June 1942 required the Allies to attain several objectives. First, the U.S. Pacific Fleet needed to keep the Japanese Combined Fleet in check, if not totally destroy it. Second, Allied air superiority had to be established and maintained with both land- and carrier-based aircraft. Third, Allied forces needed to carry out repeated large-scale amphibious assaults. Finally, rolling back the Japanese forces meant attacking a strategic defense-in-depth in the Pacific, where island chains potentially served as mutually supporting bases of operations. To reach all these overlapping objectives, the Allies employed “island-hopping” and “leap-frogging” strategies to maximize limited resources, shorten time, and reduce casualties.
In theory, island-hopping made sense as a solution to cracking an island-based defense-in-depth. This strategy can be understood in the following example. U.S. amphibious and naval forces successfully subdue a Japanese island base, X. In the following month or two, fresh troops replace the exhausted assault forces and crush any stubborn Japanese resistance. Then this island is used as a staging point for assaulting the next enemy-held island, Y. Seabees and army engineers speedily repair or construct airfields and dredge harbors as Allied forces mass for the next leg of the campaign. Island X serves as air base, safe anchorage, and supply depot for the men and materiel being ferried from Australia or Hawaii. Fresh marine and army divisions receive their last-minute training before their amphibious assault on island Y with support from naval forces and aircraft based on island X. This strategy was employed during the Solomons campaign and later at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Island-hopping proved to be a strategic necessity early in the Pacific war. As 1942 drew to a close and 1943 began, the Allies could muster only limited carrier strength because of losses around Guadalcanal. At one point in October 1942, USS Enterprise was the only operational aircraft carrier in the theater, and it desperately needed an overhaul. Until the new Essex-class carriers became operational, amphibious attacks could not be supported beyond the range of land-based aircraft. Consequently, hopping from island to island under cover of aircraft from nearby bases was the only practical option.[2] |
” |
Related books
- Asada, Sadao (2006), From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States, Annapolis, Maryland, USA: Naval Institute Press. ISBN-10: 1557500428
- Island Hopping across the Pacific Theater in World War II: The History of America’s Victorious Leapfrogging Strategy against Imperial Japan, Publisher: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform (November 23, 2017), ISBN-10: 9781979992800
See also
External links
- Island-Hopping and Leap-frogging, U.S. Strategies, Warhistory.org