Difference between revisions of "INF Treaty"

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(Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025)
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Both sides provided detailed inventories of their missile systems and destruction sites.
 
Both sides provided detailed inventories of their missile systems and destruction sites.
  
==Indefinite Duration==
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==Duration==
  
 
The treaty was of unlimited duration, meaning it remained in force until a party withdrew (as the US did in 2019, citing Russian non-compliance with the 9M729 missile).
 
The treaty was of unlimited duration, meaning it remained in force until a party withdrew (as the US did in 2019, citing Russian non-compliance with the 9M729 missile).

Revision as of 03:50, January 26, 2026

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty for short, called for the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that could travel between 500 and 5500 Km (approx 310–3400 miles). It also called for them to abandon all methods of maintaining and developing these missiles. This treaty decreased the number of nuclear weapons. It was signed by the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and President Ronald Reagan on January 15, 1988.

This treaty signed by Ronald Reagan, is considered a landmark Cold War agreement.

The United States "inter-agency consensus" formally withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019. The Russian Federation abandoned its moratorium on deploying short and medium-range missiles on August 4, 2025.[1]

Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles

The treaty required the US and Soviet Union to eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (approximately 300–3,400 miles), including both nuclear and conventional variants. Intermediate-range (1,000–5,500 km) and shorter-range (500–1,000 km) missiles were targeted, covering systems like the US Pershing II and Soviet SS-20 Saber.

By June 1, 1991, both parties were to complete the destruction of these missiles and their launchers, resulting in the elimination of 2,692 missiles (1,846 Soviet, 846 US).

Prohibition on Production and Testing

The treaty banned the production, flight-testing, or possession of ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles after the elimination deadline.

This applied to both nuclear and conventional missiles within the specified range, ensuring no new systems could replace those destroyed.

Scope and Exclusions

The treaty covered ground-launched missiles only, excluding air-launched and sea-launched systems (e.g., submarine- or ship-based missiles like the US Tomahawk missiles).

It applied to missiles regardless of warhead type (nuclear or conventional), making it comprehensive within its range category.

Support structures, such as launchers and associated equipment, were also to be destroyed or rendered unusable.

Verification and Inspection

The treaty established a robust verification regime, including on-site inspections, data exchanges, and continuous monitoring of missile production facilities to ensure compliance.

A Special Verification Commission was created to resolve compliance disputes, with inspections continuing for 13 years after 1991 (until 2001).

Both sides provided detailed inventories of their missile systems and destruction sites.

Duration

The treaty was of unlimited duration, meaning it remained in force until a party withdrew (as the US did in 2019, citing Russian non-compliance with the 9M729 missile).

Either party could withdraw with six months notice if they believed their supreme interests were jeopardized.

Global Application

The treaty prohibited deploying covered missiles anywhere in the world, not just in Europe, addressing concerns about Soviet SS-20s targeting Asia and US Pershing IIs in Europe.

It applied to missiles stationed in allied territories (e.g., US missiles in NATO countries, Soviet missiles in Warsaw Pact states).

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025

Against the backdrop of deliberate steps by the United States, which resulted in the termination in 2019 of the validity and existence of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), as well as in subsequent years, the Russian Federation has been proactively making efforts to promote restraint in this area. In particular, this was reflected in the top-level statements made in 2019-2020, which provided for the voluntary adoption by our country of unilateral self-restrictions precluding the deployment of ground-launched INF-range missiles unless similar US-made missile weapons emerge in the relevant regions of the world. In parallel, Russia directly called upon NATO countries to declare a reciprocal moratorium on deploying weapon systems formerly banned under the INF Treaty, and upon the US allies in the Asia-Pacific to support our efforts in preventing a race of such armaments in the region.

However, we have to state that Russian initiatives have not been reciprocated. The United States and its allies have not only openly declared plans to deploy US ground-launched INF-range missiles in various regions, but have also made significant progress in the practical implementation of their intentions. The increasing body of objective data reveals, in particular, the following: the testing of baseline versions of a wide range of the above-mentioned weapons developed by Washington has mostly completed or is at its final stages; serial production of some of these systems is now underway; the Pentagon is forming and locating specialized units and commands in respective regions to enable the forward deployment and employment of such weapons; the requisite infrastructure is also being prepared to suit these purposes; there is growing evidence that missile systems of the aforementioned range are transferred directly to areas of military exercises conducted jointly with allies outside the US national territory.

Specifically, since 2023, we have observed instances when US systems capable of launching INF-range missiles from land were transported to some European NATO countries for trial use in the course of exercises that clearly had anti-Russian focus. In particular, it includes drills in Denmark involving a mobile (portable) Mk70 launcher.

With regard to the Asia-Pacific, we note that under the pretext of training activities, a Typhon mid-range missile system was brought to the Philippines in April 2024 and is still stationed on the archipelago. A system of the same type was employed this July in Australia during live-fire exercises as part of the Talisman Sabre 2025 multilateral drills. In the course of these drills, the US military personnel also deployed a Dark Eagle hypersonic intermediate-range system, marking its first overseas appearance. It was openly declared that this deployment was undertaken "to project power", as well as underscored that such systems are rapidly redeployable.

Furthermore, during Talisman Sabre 2025, an Australian crew of the US-supplied HIMARS system launched a US-manufactured PrSM missile, which had been tested by the Pentagon back in 2021 to a range of more than 500 km and which consequently qualifies as a ground-launched INF-class missile. Prior to this, such missiles were launched by the US Army units using a future autonomous HIMARS-based platform during a live-fire event that took place last June on the territory of the Republic of Palau.

Notably, the described tests and training launches of the PrSM missile, future modifications of which are expected to be test-fired at ranges exceeding 1000 km, effectively mean that every combat unit of the M142 HIMARS and similar M270 MLRS tracked system can be regarded as a land-based launcher for INF-range missiles. And this comes while significant numbers of the US weapons of these types have already been deployed and continue to be stationed in many countries around the world, adding in multiple cases to the arsenals of US allies and partners, including Ukraine, which is employing these systems in its warfare against the Russian Federation.

[...]

Washington and Berlin have announced plans to begin in 2026 deployments of the aforementioned Typhon and Dark Eagle systems in the German territory, aiming at their “enduring stationing”. Moreover, a specialized “Task Force” of the US military personnel has already been permanently positioned in Germany since 2021.

A significant additional factor is the stated intention by several US allies to aquire ground-launched INF-range missiles from Washington and / or develop their own missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 km, or to expand their existing national arsenals of such weapons. Obviously, such weapon systems will supplement the inventory of means to be used while practicing and potentially conducting the so-called “integrated” operations jointly planned by US and allied militaries within relevant alliances and coalitions.

In aggregate, the above-mentioned steps of “the collective West” entail the formation and augmentation of destabilizing missile capabilities in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation, creating a direct threat to the security of our country, which is strategic in nature. In general, these dynamics carry a serious negative charge and are fraught with significant destructive implications for regional and global stability, including a dangerous escalation of tensions between nuclear powers.

Russia has consistently made it clear that such a scenario will demand that our country take offsetting military-technical measures in order to counter newly emerging threats and maintain strategic balance. Since our repeated warnings in this regard have been ignored and the situation is developing along the path of the actual emplacement of the US-made ground-launched INF-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, the Russian Foreign Ministry has to state that the conditions for maintaining a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar weapons have ceased to exist. The Ministry is authorized to declare that the Russian Federation no longer considers itself bound by the relevant previously adopted self-restrictions.

Decisions on the specific parameters of response measures will be made by the leadership of the Russian Federation based on interagency analysis with regard to the scope of the deployment of the US and other Western ground-launched INF-range missiles, as well as to the overall evolution in the area of international security and strategic stability.[2]

References

External links