:"In mid-February 2026, before the [[US]] [[military]] initiated the airstrikes that began Operation “[[Epic Fury]],” the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an agency of the [[executive branch]] created to synthesize the analysis of the [[US intelligence community|US’s 18 intelligence agencies]], submitted to the [[president]] a classified report detailing the prospects of an attack on [[Iran]]. This assessment, first reported on in the [[Washington Post]] and subsequently confirmed by the [[Associated Press]], painted a grim picture. It concluded that an offensive operation launched by the US military would be unlikely to dismantle the central pillars of the Iranian government. Assassinating Iranian Supreme Leader [[Ali Khamenei]] could backfire, resulting in the consolidation of Iranian [[military]] and [[political]] structures and the activation of emergency protocols the Iranians had been preparing for years. Iran’s [[domestic]] opposition was unlikely to be able to seize power in such a scenario. A limited air campaign or even a protracted war stood a serious chance of failing to achieve [[regime change]]..." | :"In mid-February 2026, before the [[US]] [[military]] initiated the airstrikes that began Operation “[[Epic Fury]],” the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an agency of the [[executive branch]] created to synthesize the analysis of the [[US intelligence community|US’s 18 intelligence agencies]], submitted to the [[president]] a classified report detailing the prospects of an attack on [[Iran]]. This assessment, first reported on in the [[Washington Post]] and subsequently confirmed by the [[Associated Press]], painted a grim picture. It concluded that an offensive operation launched by the US military would be unlikely to dismantle the central pillars of the Iranian government. Assassinating Iranian Supreme Leader [[Ali Khamenei]] could backfire, resulting in the consolidation of Iranian [[military]] and [[political]] structures and the activation of emergency protocols the Iranians had been preparing for years. Iran’s [[domestic]] opposition was unlikely to be able to seize power in such a scenario. A limited air campaign or even a protracted war stood a serious chance of failing to achieve [[regime change]]..." |