Difference between revisions of "Christensen v. Harris County"
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| − | ''Christensen v. Harris County'', 529 U.S. 576 (2000), established the rule that a regulatory [[agency]]'s interpretation, as set forth in an internal guidance memoranda or other means lacking benefits of the rulemaking procedure, does not qualify for the dispositive force described in ''Chevron''. "Interpretations such as those in ... policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law--do not warrant ''Chevron''-style deference." ''Id.'' at 587. ''See also United States v. Mead Corp.'', 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). | + | ''Christensen v. Harris County'', 529 U.S. 576 (2000), established the rule that a regulatory [[agency]]'s interpretation, as set forth in an internal guidance memoranda or other means lacking benefits of the rulemaking procedure, does not qualify for the dispositive force described in ''[[Chevron]]''. "Interpretations such as those in ... policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law--do not warrant ''[[Chevron]]''-style deference." ''Id.'' at 587. ''See also United States v. Mead Corp.'', 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). |
[[category:US Supreme Court Cases]] | [[category:US Supreme Court Cases]] | ||
Revision as of 01:34, August 23, 2007
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), established the rule that a regulatory agency's interpretation, as set forth in an internal guidance memoranda or other means lacking benefits of the rulemaking procedure, does not qualify for the dispositive force described in Chevron. "Interpretations such as those in ... policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law--do not warrant Chevron-style deference." Id. at 587. See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).