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Line 1: − + − − If the traditional Judeo Christian God exists, then he is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. − − − Thus, evil would not exist. − − However, evil exists. − − Therefore, the traditional Judeo Christian God does not exist. + + + + + − + − REJECTING OMNIPOTENCE:+ − REJECTING OMNIBENEVOLENCE:+ − REJECTING THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL:+ Line 29:
Line 25: − + + + − There is also the question of whether an omnibenevolent God should want all evil to be stopped. If the allowance of evil makes possible some greater good, then the allowance of evil itself is not wrong. For instance if the exercise of free will means that evil can occur, is it better to create independent beings and allow free will or to not create at all?+ + +
Corrections, including pointing out the flaw in the argument; formatting
The '''problem of [[evil]]''' is a topic of much debate in theology and the philosophy of religion. It has been referred to as 'the rock of atheism', and is one of the major philosophical and emotional reasons for the active disbelief in a traditional monotheistic God. The problem can be expressed as follows:
The so-called '''problem of [[evil]]''' is a topic of much debate in theology and the philosophy of religion. It has been referred to as 'the rock of atheism', and is one of the major philosophical and emotional reasons for the active disbelief in a traditional monotheistic God. The problem can be expressed as follows:
In the traditional Judeo-Christian view of God:
* He is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent.
** Thus, evil would not exist.
* However, evil exists.
** Therefore, the traditional Judeo-Christian God does not exist.
== Questioning the Premise ==
== Questioning the Premise ==
The argument is dismissed by dropping one or more of the three starting givens: that God is omnipotent, that God is omnibenevolent, or that evil exists.
The argument can be dismissed by dropping one or more of the givens: that God is omniscient, that God is omnipotent, that God is omnibenevolent, or that evil exists.
'''Rejecting omnipotence:'''
If God is not all powerful, then his ability to constrain all evil in any given moment is limited.
If God is not all powerful, then his ability to constrain all evil in any given moment is limited.
'''Rejecting Omnibenevolence:'''
If God is not all good, then evil may exist.
If God is not all good, then evil may exist.
'''Rejecting the existence of evil:'''
Perhaps evil does not exist - a view taken by [[Augustine]] who classified evil as a [[privation]]. Perhaps we call those things we do not like 'moral evils' without justification. But it strikes at the heart of our intuitions about what it means for something to be morally wrong if something like the torture of innocent children would not count.
Perhaps evil does not exist - a view taken by [[Augustine]] who classified evil as a [[privation]]. Perhaps we call those things we do not like 'moral evils' without justification. But it strikes at the heart of our intuitions about what it means for something to be morally wrong if something like the torture of innocent children would not count.
Also, rejecting the existence of evil would appear to contradict Scripture: ''I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these [things].'' (Isaiah 45:7, KJV)
Also, rejecting the existence of evil would appear to contradict Scripture: ''I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these [things].'' (Isaiah 45:7, KJV)
'TAPESTRY' VIEW:
''''Tapestry' view:'''
However, the argument is flawed in that the conclusion that evil would not exist given an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God does not necessarily follow from the premises.
That is, there is the question of whether an omnibenevolent God should want to prevent all evil.
If the allowance of evil serves some greater good, then the allowance of evil itself is not inconsistent with an omnibenevolent God.
For instance, if the exercise of free will means that evil can occur, is it better to create independent beings and allow free will or to not create at all?
Several [[theodicies]] put forward as attempts to give understanding to the problem of evil - for example, by [[Augustine]] and [[Irenaeus]], but complete understanding to infinitive questions is not going to be understood in finite beings with finite resources.
Several [[theodicies]] put forward as attempts to give understanding to the problem of evil - for example, by [[Augustine]] and [[Irenaeus]], but complete understanding to infinitive questions is not going to be understood in finite beings with finite resources.