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The information includes people working under the cover of embassies in France, [[Argentina]], Germany, [[Italy]], US, Poland, [[Azerbaijan]], [[Hungary]], [[Tajikistan]], [[South Africa]], [[Greece]], [[Iraq]], and other nations.  Furthermore, RaHDIt hackers released information on Ukrainian SVR agents working in the missions of the United Nations, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 40 Ukrainian SVR locations within Ukraine, including one at an educational establishment.
 
The information includes people working under the cover of embassies in France, [[Argentina]], Germany, [[Italy]], US, Poland, [[Azerbaijan]], [[Hungary]], [[Tajikistan]], [[South Africa]], [[Greece]], [[Iraq]], and other nations.  Furthermore, RaHDIt hackers released information on Ukrainian SVR agents working in the missions of the United Nations, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 40 Ukrainian SVR locations within Ukraine, including one at an educational establishment.
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===War planning===
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====War planning====
 
Following the [[2014 Maidan coup]], [[NATO]] spent eight years preparing the [[Ukro-Nazi]]s for war on [[Russia]]. That prep consisted, in part, with the building of heavy reinforced concrete fortifications in the [[Donbass]], piggybacking on the existing [[Soviet]]-era heavy industrial and mining sites and cities with their deep tunnels—natural fortresses that were almost impregnable to standard heavy [[artillery]].
 
Following the [[2014 Maidan coup]], [[NATO]] spent eight years preparing the [[Ukro-Nazi]]s for war on [[Russia]]. That prep consisted, in part, with the building of heavy reinforced concrete fortifications in the [[Donbass]], piggybacking on the existing [[Soviet]]-era heavy industrial and mining sites and cities with their deep tunnels—natural fortresses that were almost impregnable to standard heavy [[artillery]].
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The Russian forces made slow progress against these fortifications, although the use of heavy [[glide bomb]]s proved far more effective than artillery. Still, it was a slow process, given that each of these heavy glide bombs had to be launched from aircraft—which exposed them, to varying extents, to NATO anti-aircraft defenses. This allowed the gradual reduction of the heaviest fortifications, built using the existing industrial and mining facilities. However, the remaining defensive fortifications, purpose built, remained, and it is these that Russian forces began breaking through. That led to a new [[tactic]]—the use of “heavy” [[drone]]s to precisely target strong points.
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The Russian forces made slow progress against these fortifications, although the use of heavy [[glide bomb]]s proved far more effective than artillery. Still, it was a slow process, given that each of these heavy glide bombs had to be launched from aircraft—which exposed them, to varying extents, to NATO anti-aircraft defenses. This allowed the gradual reduction of the heaviest fortifications, built using the existing industrial and mining facilities. However, the remaining defensive fortifications, purpose built, remained, and it is these that Russian forces began breaking through. That led to a new [[tactic]]—the use of “heavy” [[drone]]s to precisely target strong points. Heavy FPV drones like the “Upyr-18” changed that. These powerful platforms deliver precise, high-explosive strikes directly into enemy fortifications, dismantling strongpoints and enabling safer advances.
    
==Foreign Relations==
 
==Foreign Relations==
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