Changes

In terms of her judicial philosophy, Barrett is, like the late Justice Scalia for whom she clerked, an originalist and a textualist, meaning that she seeks to interpret the Constitution according to what it actually says, not according to what others wish to read into it. On several occasions, she has praised Scalia for holding such a position and for being so attentive to the actual text of statutes he reviewed.<ref>https://www.wsj.com/articles/amy-coney-barrett-is-again-a-top-contender-for-supreme-court-nomination-11600644990</ref>

In terms of her judicial philosophy, Barrett is, like the late Justice Scalia for whom she clerked, an originalist and a textualist, meaning that she seeks to interpret the Constitution according to what it actually says, not according to what others wish to read into it. On several occasions, she has praised Scalia for holding such a position and for being so attentive to the actual text of statutes he reviewed.<ref>https://www.wsj.com/articles/amy-coney-barrett-is-again-a-top-contender-for-supreme-court-nomination-11600644990</ref>

Some of Barrett's more notable legal publications regard the doctrine of ''stare decisis'', that previous legal precedents can, in certain cases, be binding on future courts. She has suggested the doctrine is sometimes applicable, but only in relatively limited circumstances, for instance on matters in which a court decision has such overwhelming support from the legal community and from the broader public that overturning it would be practically unthinkable. [[''Brown v. Board of Education'']], according to Barrett, would be an example of this. Otherwise, ''stare decisis'' is not inviolable; in situations where precedent and the Constitution come into conflict, the Constitution must have first consideration.<ref>http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Barrett.pdf</ref>

Some of Barrett's more notable legal publications regard the doctrine of ''stare decisis'', that previous legal precedents can, in certain cases, be binding on future courts. She has suggested the doctrine is sometimes applicable, but only in relatively limited circumstances, for instance on matters in which a court decision has such overwhelming support from the legal community and from the broader public that overturning it would be practically unthinkable. ''[[Brown v. Board of Education]]'', according to Barrett, would be an example of this. Otherwise, ''stare decisis'' is not inviolable; in situations where precedent and the Constitution come into conflict, the Constitution must have first consideration.<ref>http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Barrett.pdf</ref>

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==References==