Difference between revisions of "Evolutionary game theory"
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(clarified and removed superfluous citation of Dawkins...he defines an ESS verbatim after Smith and Price) |
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| − | In the field of evolutionary game theory, an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population. | + | In the field of [[evolution|evolutionary]] game theory, an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population. |
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
Revision as of 04:47, December 12, 2009
In the field of evolutionary game theory, an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by population geneticists John Maynard Smith and George R. Price[1]. It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population.
See also
References
- ↑ Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246: 15-18.
Further reading
- Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. ISBN 0-521-28884-3