| Line 13: |
Line 13: |
| | Nonetheless, an identified operative must be cut off from access to further secure information, without letting him know that his [[Cover (intelligence)|cover]] is blown, then fed an elaborate stream of credible [[disinformation]]. Then an assessment must be made as to the extent of the damage and what information has been compromised. Eventually, the mole and his handlers will realize their operation has been compromised because of the useless disinformation being passed; but this step buys time for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards" to determine what has been compromised within the target organization. That is the point at which an arrest is usually made. Sometimes, however, the process of feeding disinformation can be useful, so a discovered agent may be left in place for years. | | Nonetheless, an identified operative must be cut off from access to further secure information, without letting him know that his [[Cover (intelligence)|cover]] is blown, then fed an elaborate stream of credible [[disinformation]]. Then an assessment must be made as to the extent of the damage and what information has been compromised. Eventually, the mole and his handlers will realize their operation has been compromised because of the useless disinformation being passed; but this step buys time for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards" to determine what has been compromised within the target organization. That is the point at which an arrest is usually made. Sometimes, however, the process of feeding disinformation can be useful, so a discovered agent may be left in place for years. |
| | | | |
| − | Occassionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole; that is, gain his cooperation without exposing to his controllers that his cover has been blown. Turning a mole can make him an unwilling agent of either side, either to continue the feed of disinformation, or being coerced at threat of imprisonment to betray his compatriot organization. In the famous case of [[Arkady Schevchenko]], a Soviet [[Diplomacy|diplomat]] to the [[United Nations]] who asked to [[defector|defect]], rather than accept his defection the CIA required he remain in place and engage in espionage. Schevchenko was a professional diplomat, not a spy, and he found the stressful work nerve-wracking.
| + | Occasionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole; that is, gain his cooperation without exposing to his controllers that his cover has been blown. Turning a mole can make him an unwilling agent of either side, either to continue the feed of disinformation, or being coerced at threat of imprisonment to betray his compatriot organization. In the famous case of [[Arkady Schevchenko]], a Soviet [[Diplomacy|diplomat]] to the [[United Nations]] who asked to [[defector|defect]], rather than accept his defection the CIA required he remain in place and engage in espionage. Schevchenko was a professional diplomat, not a spy, and he found the stressful work nerve-wracking. |
| | | | |
| | CI is similar to, and often confused with, HUMINT, as CI uses many of the same techniques for the information collection. CI obtains information by or through the functions of CI operations,investigations, collection and reporting, analysis, production, dissemination, and functional services. CI is not solely a collection discipline, however, and also acts upon information for both offensive and defensive purposes, in coordination with other intelligence disciplines, law enforcement and/or security elements. | | CI is similar to, and often confused with, HUMINT, as CI uses many of the same techniques for the information collection. CI obtains information by or through the functions of CI operations,investigations, collection and reporting, analysis, production, dissemination, and functional services. CI is not solely a collection discipline, however, and also acts upon information for both offensive and defensive purposes, in coordination with other intelligence disciplines, law enforcement and/or security elements. |
| | | | |
| − | A). The function of CI is to provide direct support to operational commanders, program managers, and decision makers. This support includes: CI support to force protection during all types and phases of military operations; detection identification and neutralization of espionage; antiterrorism; threat assessments; counterproliferation actions; countering illegal technology transfer; acquisitions systems protection; support to other intelligence activities; information systems protection; and treaty support.
| + | # The function of CI is to provide direct support to operational commanders, program managers, and decision makers. This support includes: CI support to force protection during all types and phases of military operations; detection identification and neutralization of espionage; antiterrorism; threat assessments; counterproliferation actions; countering illegal technology transfer; acquisitions systems protection; support to other intelligence activities; information systems protection; and treaty support. |
| | | | |
| − | B). Although CI is an activity separate and distinct from foreign intelligence, it supports the foreign intelligence disciplines through its contribution to the I&W function, by its collection, analysis, and production capabilities, and by maintenance of CI databases.
| + | # Although CI is an activity separate and distinct from foreign intelligence, it supports the foreign intelligence disciplines through its contribution to the I&W function, by its collection, analysis, and production capabilities, and by maintenance of CI databases. |
| | | | |
| | ===MICE=== | | ===MICE=== |
| − | The concept of "[[Motives for spying#Motivations|MICE]]" was originated by American counterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates a person to be willing to betray their own country. It can be regarded as one of America's contributions to the art and science of the business, now that both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simple [[mnemonic]], to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents in the service of a foreign organization. The concept is simple: it is either [[Money]], [[Ideology]], [[Coercion]], or Excitement, that causes a person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbours, or their whole country, and go into the service of a foreign espionage organization. Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted for ideology, or "[[ego]]" for excitment, but the end result is the same. It is claimed that no one has produced a better summary of traitors' motivations. | + | The concept of "[[Motives for spying#Motivations|MICE]]" was originated by American counterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates a person to be willing to betray their own country. It can be regarded as one of America's contributions to the art and science of the business, now that both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simple [[mnemonic]], to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents in the service of a foreign organization. The concept is simple: it is either [[Money]], [[Ideology]], [[Coercion]], or Excitement, that causes a person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbours, or their whole country, and go into the service of a foreign espionage organization. Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted for ideology, or "[[ego]]" for excitement, but the end result is the same. It is claimed that no one has produced a better summary of traitors' motivations. |
| | | | |
| | Individuals who are motivated to betray their country for money, out of greed, tend to be persons who feel life has cheated them out of their just rewards, so they have no qualms about being fairly compensated, in their own eyes, for their worth. At the same they can get back at the society which has misunderstood and not appreciated their talents. When [[Aldrich Ames]] bought an $80,000 Jaguar, there was not the slightest pretence of hiding the fruit of his labors. | | Individuals who are motivated to betray their country for money, out of greed, tend to be persons who feel life has cheated them out of their just rewards, so they have no qualms about being fairly compensated, in their own eyes, for their worth. At the same they can get back at the society which has misunderstood and not appreciated their talents. When [[Aldrich Ames]] bought an $80,000 Jaguar, there was not the slightest pretence of hiding the fruit of his labors. |
| Line 55: |
Line 55: |
| | [[KGB]] recruiting practices provide an excellent example to study based upon their record of success. The Soviet Union recovered from a defeat in the [[Polish-Soviet War]] in 1920 to become one of the worlds' only two [[superpowers]] armed with [[nuclear weapons]] within 30 years based on their skilled use of espionage. | | [[KGB]] recruiting practices provide an excellent example to study based upon their record of success. The Soviet Union recovered from a defeat in the [[Polish-Soviet War]] in 1920 to become one of the worlds' only two [[superpowers]] armed with [[nuclear weapons]] within 30 years based on their skilled use of espionage. |
| | | | |
| − | The first step was obtaining permission from the Moscow (or 'the Center'). A subsequent step was the conduct of a formal recruitment interview by an experienced operative or officer. Topic number one in the interview was the person's motivation for spying for Russia, with the attendant issue of whether or not the person was a provocateur of another intelligence service. Often times the language of "contracts" is used, with reference to such things like "signing on". Following the recruitment meeting the recruiting officer submitted a comprehensive report to the Center. | + | The first step was obtaining permission from the Moscow (or 'the Center'). A subsequent step was the conduct of a formal recruitment interview by an experienced operative or officer. Topic number one in the interview was the person's motivation for spying for Russia, with the attendant issue of whether or not the person was a provocateur of another intelligence service. Oftentimes the language of "contracts" is used, with reference to such things like "signing on". Following the recruitment meeting the recruiting officer submitted a comprehensive report to the Center. |
| | | | |
| | ===Training=== | | ===Training=== |
| Line 79: |
Line 79: |
| | So the most valuable and productive members of the ring are isolated from contact with foreign Agent case officers, which is safest for both. One member gathers all the collected material from all infiltrators, then will pass the information to another cutout outside the government. That second cutout likewise is usually a natural citizen, though not employed by the target government, but who then can transmit the information directly to the foreign intelligence service. | | So the most valuable and productive members of the ring are isolated from contact with foreign Agent case officers, which is safest for both. One member gathers all the collected material from all infiltrators, then will pass the information to another cutout outside the government. That second cutout likewise is usually a natural citizen, though not employed by the target government, but who then can transmit the information directly to the foreign intelligence service. |
| | | | |
| − | The extensive use of cutouts, so long as they are trusted and reliable persons, can become a long chain of individuals. This performs another purpose, similiar to the extensive use of "front organizations"; by their sheer number, it becomes a shell game with counterintelligence investigators, who have finite and limited resources. When suspicion arises, the large number of persons and organizations connected to the conspiracy can devour endless hours and cost, which has the effect of slowing down the process of exposing an espionage organization. | + | The extensive use of cutouts, so long as they are trusted and reliable persons, can become a long chain of individuals. This performs another purpose, similar to the extensive use of "front organizations"; by their sheer number, it becomes a shell game with counterintelligence investigators, who have finite and limited resources. When suspicion arises, the large number of persons and organizations connected to the conspiracy can devour endless hours and cost, which has the effect of slowing down the process of exposing an espionage organization. |
| | | | |
| | ===Human Intelligence=== | | ===Human Intelligence=== |