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| | *Internet and Social Media Controls: Uyghurs in some areas of the XUAR are required to install an application on their [[mobile phone]]s that enables authorities to monitor their online activities. | | *Internet and Social Media Controls: Uyghurs in some areas of the XUAR are required to install an application on their [[mobile phone]]s that enables authorities to monitor their online activities. |
| | *Home stays: The government has sent an estimated one million officials and state workers from outside the XUAR, mostly ethnic Han, to live temporarily in the homes of Uyghurs to assess their hosts’ loyalty to the Communist Party.<ref>https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1148671/download</ref> | | *Home stays: The government has sent an estimated one million officials and state workers from outside the XUAR, mostly ethnic Han, to live temporarily in the homes of Uyghurs to assess their hosts’ loyalty to the Communist Party.<ref>https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1148671/download</ref> |
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| | + | ====Uyghur genocide==== |
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| | + | Natural population growth in Xinjiang has declined dramatically; growth rates fell by 84 percent in the two largest Uyghur prefectures between 2015 and 2018, and declined further in several minority regions in 2019. For 2020, one Uyghur region set an unprecedented near-zero birth rate target: a mere 1.05 per mille, compared to 19.66 per mille in 2018. This was intended to be achieved through “family planning work.” |
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| | + | Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government documents bluntly mandate that birth control violations are punishable by extrajudicial internment in “training” camps. This confirms evidence such violations were the most common reason for internment (Journal of Political Risk, February 2020). |
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| | + | XUAR documents from 2019 reveal plans for a campaign of mass female sterilization in rural Uyghur regions, targeting 14 and 34 percent of all married women of childbearing age in two Uyghur counties that year. This project targeted all of southern Xinjiang, and continued in 2020 with increased funding. This campaign likely aims to sterilize rural minority women with three or more children, as well as some with two children—equivalent to at least 20 percent of all childbearing-age women. Budget figures indicate that this project had sufficient funding for performing hundreds of thousands of tubal ligation sterilization procedures in 2019 and 2020, with at least one region receiving additional central government funding. In 2018, a Uyghur prefecture openly set a goal of leading its rural populations to accept widespread sterilization surgery. |
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| | + | By 2019, XAUR planned to subject at least 80 percent of women of childbearing age in the rural southern four minority prefectures to intrusive birth prevention surgeries (IUDs or sterilizations), with actual shares likely being much higher. In 2018, 80 percent of all net added IUD placements in China (calculated as placements minus removals) were performed in Xinjiang, despite the fact that the region only makes up 1.8 percent of the PRC’s population. |
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| | + | Shares of women aged 18 to 49 who were either widowed or in menopause have more than doubled since the onset of the internment campaign in one particular Uyghur region. These are potential proxy indicators for unnatural deaths (possibly of interned husbands), and/or of injections given in internment that can cause temporary or permanent loss of menstrual cycles. |
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| | + | Between 2015 and 2018, about 860,000 ethnic Han residents left Xinjiang, while up to 2 million new residents were added to Xinjiang’s Han majority regions. Also, population growth rates in a Uyghur region where Han constitute the majority were nearly 8 times higher than in the surrounding rural Uyghur regions (in 2018). These figures raise concerns that Beijing is doubling down on a policy of Han settler [[colonialism]]. |
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| | + | These findings provide the strongest evidence yet that Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang meet one of the [[genocide]] criteria cited in the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, namely that of Section D of Article II: “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the [targeted] group” (United Nations, December 9, 1948).<ref>[https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x79141 STERILIZATIONS,IUDS, AND MANDATORY BIRTH CONTROL: THE CCP’S CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS UYGHUR BIRTHRATES IN XINJIANG]'', Adrian Zenz, June 2020 Updated July 21, 2020. The Jamestown Foundation.</ref> |
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| | + | Xinjiang's largest concentration camp is twice the size of [[Vatican City]].<ref>https://japantoday.com/category/world/ap-looks-inside-china%27s-largest-detention-center-in-xinjiang1</ref> As of 2021, Xinjiang had over 300 concentration camps, or 206 million square feet with enough capacity to incarcerate seven times the prison population in the United States.<ref>https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/china-can-lock-million-muslims-xinjiang-once</ref> |
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| | + | '''<big>Hong Kong</big>''' |
| | + | :{{Main article|Hong Kong Independence Movement}} |
| | + | [[File:Hong Kong protests.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Grafetti from the late November 2019 Hong Kong democracy protests reads: "Dear World, CCP will infiltrate your government, Chinese enterprises $ interfere your political stance, China will harvest your home like [[Xinjiang]]. BE AWARE or BE NEXT!"<ref>https://twitter.com/HKstreetart/status/1196483549492391937/photo/1</ref>]] |
| | + | [[Hong Kong]] was guaranteed its democratic sovereignty in a peace arrangement between the [[United Kingdom]] in 1997, and [[Macau]] was handed over by [[Portugal]] in 1999. <!--Both territories are now [[Special Administrative Region]]s and have autonomy over local affairs. However, the autonomy has been eroded in recent years, particularly after the 2014 "Umbrella Revolution".--> In 2020, the CCP violated and abolished the international peace agreement guarantying Hong Kong's democratic sovereignty, and brought the formerly free people under control of the oppressive socialist and communist slave system. |
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| | + | The Hong Kong branch of the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1947 as the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch. Although the party has ruled Hong Kong since 1997, it remains technically illegal, or "underground." This status, unique among the world's ruling parties, allows the CCP to evade local laws that require political parties to disclose financing and to provide a membership list. In 2000, the name of the branch was changed to "Liaison Office of the Central People's Government." It is headquartered in a tower in the city's Sai Ying Pun district. In 2003, the office was reorganized as a "second government" parallel and equal in status to the "local government" in Admiralty. Since 2012, Sai Ying Pun has been the dominant partner in the Hong Kong government. The Liaison Office is headed by a director, currently Luo Huining. Luo is a member of the national party's central committee. The office has extensive and undisclosed property holdings through Newman Investment, a subsidiary. The office reports to the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, an agency of the Beijing government. This agency is currently headed by Xia Baolong, also a central committee member. |
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| | + | The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 provides that Hong Kong will enjoy a "high degree of autonomy except for foreign and defence affairs" under a "one country, two systems" approach. This approach was to last for fifty years, from 1997 to 2047. China promised that it would hold a direct election for chief executive by 2017. In August 2014, the Chinese parliament announced that Hong Kong voters would choose a chief executive from two or three candidates nominated by a committee. This announcement triggered mass pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in the form of the Umbrella Movement. The protests failed to the stop the selection of Carrie Lam as chief executive in 2017. In 2017, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that the joint declaration was no longer valid. |
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| | + | In 2019 the Hong Kong government proposed a bill to [[extradite]] suspects who were wanted on the mainland. Unlike Hong Kong courts, mainland courts do not provide suspects with due process or other legal protections. A series of the enormous protests were held in Hong Kong and the bill was withdrawn on October 23, 2019. Parties that supported the pro-democracy protesters swept the District Council elections that were held in November.<ref>Loh, Christine, "[https://hkupress.hku.hk/pro/con/1724.pdf Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong]" Second Edition.</ref> |
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| | + | After the Hong Kong ''anschluss'', school textbooks were trimmed to "patriotic" standards. Terms like "Republic of China" are no longer to be found. |
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| | + | '''<big>Indo-China border</big>''' |
| | + | :{{See also|Ladakh}} |
| | + | The India-China border has not been agreed upon and has been in dispute since 1962. |
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| | + | In June 2020 troops from the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and India clashed in the Galwan Valley.<ref>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484</ref> The battle was fought with rocks, batons, and barbed wire-wrapped clubs. A 1996 agreement banned the use of guns and explosives along the disputed line of control. India reported 20 of their soldiers were killed, whereas the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) did not report any of its deaths. Indian media and the [[Russia]]n news agency [[TASS]] reported that as many as 45 PLA soldiers may have been killed.<ref>https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-says-5-military-officers-soldiers-killed-in-galwan-clash-with-india-report-2373770</ref> Over the following 12 months the PLA increased its troop strength along the border from 15,000 to 50,000 by July 2021, and moved advanced surface-to-air missiles including its HQ-9 system, which is similar to Russia’s S-300 and America’s [[Patriot missile]].<ref>https://archive.is/6Hbvt</ref> |
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| | ==References== | | ==References== |