| | Wilson as president of Princeton, and [[Theodore Roosevelt]] as president of the United States, took an intense interest in the controversy over the reform of college football. In the 1890s and early 1900s, college football faced sharp of criticism over injuries and the role of athletics in college life. Roosevelt and Wilson, loyal followers of Harvard and Princeton, had defended football in the 1890s. In the fall of 1905, however, President Roosevelt called a conference of football experts at the White House to discuss brutality and unsportsmanlike conduct. Thereafter, Roosevelt worked behind the scenes to bring about sufficient reform to preserve football and ensure that it would continue to be played at Harvard. In the years 1909-10, when college football again faced an injury crisis, Wilson worked with the presidents at Harvard and Yale to make reasonable reforms. Both Roosevelt's and Wilson's approaches were consistent with their strategies for national political change. In the years that followed the reforms on the gridiron, football evolved rapidly into the 'attractive' game that Wilson had advocated and a far less brutal game than the unruly spectacle that Roosevelt had tried to control.<ref>John S. Watterson, III, "Political Football: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and the Gridiron Reform Movement," ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 1995 25(3): 555-564 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551467 in JSTOR]</ref> | | Wilson as president of Princeton, and [[Theodore Roosevelt]] as president of the United States, took an intense interest in the controversy over the reform of college football. In the 1890s and early 1900s, college football faced sharp of criticism over injuries and the role of athletics in college life. Roosevelt and Wilson, loyal followers of Harvard and Princeton, had defended football in the 1890s. In the fall of 1905, however, President Roosevelt called a conference of football experts at the White House to discuss brutality and unsportsmanlike conduct. Thereafter, Roosevelt worked behind the scenes to bring about sufficient reform to preserve football and ensure that it would continue to be played at Harvard. In the years 1909-10, when college football again faced an injury crisis, Wilson worked with the presidents at Harvard and Yale to make reasonable reforms. Both Roosevelt's and Wilson's approaches were consistent with their strategies for national political change. In the years that followed the reforms on the gridiron, football evolved rapidly into the 'attractive' game that Wilson had advocated and a far less brutal game than the unruly spectacle that Roosevelt had tried to control.<ref>John S. Watterson, III, "Political Football: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and the Gridiron Reform Movement," ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 1995 25(3): 555-564 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551467 in JSTOR]</ref> |
| − | Wilson was the first southerner elected president since [[Zachary Taylor]] in 1848, and much of his political base came from young progressives in that region, especially intellectuals, editors and lawyers.<ref>Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson: The American as Southerner," ''Journal of Southern History,'' Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb., 1970), pp. 3-17 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2206599 in JSTOR] Andrew Johnson was not elected; he moved from vice president to president after Lincoln's death in 1865.</ref> | + | <!--Wilson was the first southerner elected president since [[Zachary Taylor]] in 1848, and much of his political base came from young progressives in that region, especially intellectuals, editors and lawyers.<ref>Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson: The American as Southerner," ''Journal of Southern History,'' Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb., 1970), pp. 3-17 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2206599 in JSTOR] Andrew Johnson was not elected; he moved from vice president to president after Lincoln's death in 1865.</ref>--> |
| | Many Civil War veterans were still alive and Wilson used the memory of the War to build nationalism and to facilitate reunion between the North and the South. In his academic work and public comments, Wilson stressed the theoretical and constitutional causes of the war, devaluing the slavery issue and stressing the moral equality of North and South, all in the interest of lessening sectional animosity. During World War I and the struggle for the League of Nations, Wilson frequently drew comparisons between Lincoln and the Union's sacrifices to save the nation and American soldiers' sacrifices during World War I to save the world. He succeeded in overcoming Southern isolationism by convincing the middle class in the region that God had preserved the Union in the Civil War in order to spread democracy throughout the world. He appealed to Southerners to demonstrate the patriotism that many said they lacked. He was able to convince them that they could wage war for democracy abroad without endangering white supremacy at home.<ref>Anthony Gaughan, "Woodrow Wilson and the Legacy of the Civil War," ''Civil War History'' 1997 43(3): 225-242; online in [[Questia]]; Gaughan, "Woodrow Wilson and the Rise of Militant Interventionism in the South," ''Journal of Southern History'' 1999 65(4): 771-808, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2587587 in JSTOR]</ref> | | Many Civil War veterans were still alive and Wilson used the memory of the War to build nationalism and to facilitate reunion between the North and the South. In his academic work and public comments, Wilson stressed the theoretical and constitutional causes of the war, devaluing the slavery issue and stressing the moral equality of North and South, all in the interest of lessening sectional animosity. During World War I and the struggle for the League of Nations, Wilson frequently drew comparisons between Lincoln and the Union's sacrifices to save the nation and American soldiers' sacrifices during World War I to save the world. He succeeded in overcoming Southern isolationism by convincing the middle class in the region that God had preserved the Union in the Civil War in order to spread democracy throughout the world. He appealed to Southerners to demonstrate the patriotism that many said they lacked. He was able to convince them that they could wage war for democracy abroad without endangering white supremacy at home.<ref>Anthony Gaughan, "Woodrow Wilson and the Legacy of the Civil War," ''Civil War History'' 1997 43(3): 225-242; online in [[Questia]]; Gaughan, "Woodrow Wilson and the Rise of Militant Interventionism in the South," ''Journal of Southern History'' 1999 65(4): 771-808, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2587587 in JSTOR]</ref> |