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2023 Ukraine summer counteroffensive (view source)
Revision as of 08:28, March 14, 2024
, 08:28, March 14, 2024→Background
This caused a rift between the Ukrainians and their [[Western alliance|Western backers]], who were frustrated at Ukrainians’ desire to keep their people alive. A mid-July 2023 ''[[New York Times]]'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/14/us/politics/ukraine-war-cluster-munitions.html</ref> reported that US officials were privately frustrated that Ukraine had become too afraid of dying to fight effectively. The officials worried that Ukrainian commanders “feared casualties among their ranks”, and had “reverted to old habits” rather than “pressing harder”. A later ''Times'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html</ref> repeated [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]’s worries that Ukrainians were too “casualty-averse”.
This caused a rift between the Ukrainians and their [[Western alliance|Western backers]], who were frustrated at Ukrainians’ desire to keep their people alive. A mid-July 2023 ''[[New York Times]]'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/14/us/politics/ukraine-war-cluster-munitions.html</ref> reported that US officials were privately frustrated that Ukraine had become too afraid of dying to fight effectively. The officials worried that Ukrainian commanders “feared casualties among their ranks”, and had “reverted to old habits” rather than “pressing harder”. A later ''Times'' article<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html</ref> repeated [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]’s worries that Ukrainians were too “casualty-averse”.
==Background==
==Background and operational planning==
{{See also|2022 Istanbul peace negotiations}}
{{See also|2022 Istanbul peace negotiations}}
The [[U.S. military]] rolled out a whole new initiative tasked specifically with integrating “open source intelligence” into its planning, giddy with possibility at the first, seemingly endlessly fruitful, ‘successes’ of this partnership with rabid pro-UA OSINT autists in the opening stanza of the war.
However, this famously proved catastrophic when reports began to trickle out that much of [[US]]/[[CIA]] mission planning for the grand Zaporozhye CounterOffensive was in fact based on outdated OSINT maps of Russia’s defenses. In short: they planned the offensive around [[Twitter]] maps made in [[MS Paint]] by light-shunning basement dwellers like Andrew Perpetua.<ref>https://www.thescore.com/mlb/news/2364664</ref> Once the Ukrainian spearhead actually reached the lines, they realized things were quite different than their Twitter intelligence had assured, because Russian forces were hip to their over reliance on such unhygienic 'data' habits, and proceeded to modify many of the defensive structures and positions.
==NATO propaganda==
==NATO propaganda==