| | Put another way, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that no federal district or appellate court has jurisdiction to review state court judgments. ''Sheehan v. Marr'', 207 F.3d 35, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2000); ''see District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman'', 460 U.S. 462 (1983); ''Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.'', 263 U.S. 413 (1923). For federal claims not presented in state court, Rooker-Feldman "forecloses lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that are 'inextricably intertwined' with the claims adjudicated in a state court." ''Sheehan'', 207 F.3d at 39-40. A federal claim is "inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." ''Hill v. Conway'', 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1999). The logic of this rule stems from the proposition that if a federal court were able to grant relief from the state-court judgment, it would be "difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment." ''Hill'', 193 F.3d at 39. | | Put another way, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that no federal district or appellate court has jurisdiction to review state court judgments. ''Sheehan v. Marr'', 207 F.3d 35, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2000); ''see District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman'', 460 U.S. 462 (1983); ''Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.'', 263 U.S. 413 (1923). For federal claims not presented in state court, Rooker-Feldman "forecloses lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that are 'inextricably intertwined' with the claims adjudicated in a state court." ''Sheehan'', 207 F.3d at 39-40. A federal claim is "inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." ''Hill v. Conway'', 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1999). The logic of this rule stems from the proposition that if a federal court were able to grant relief from the state-court judgment, it would be "difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment." ''Hill'', 193 F.3d at 39. |
| | + | {{cquote|''Rooker'' squarely holds that a state court's judgment cannot be assailed in independent federal litigation as a denial of due process; the losing litigant's proper recourse is a petition for a writ of certiorari. See also, e.g., ''District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman'', 460 U.S. 462, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983); ''Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.'', 481 U.S. 1, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). The district court dismissed the suit under the ''Rooker-Feldman'' doctrine, and the McClures have appealed.}} |
| | The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] has held Rooker-Feldman to be inapplicable where the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding. See ''[[Johnson v. De Grandy|De Grandy]]'', supra, at 1006, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 129 L. Ed. 2d 775. | | The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] has held Rooker-Feldman to be inapplicable where the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding. See ''[[Johnson v. De Grandy|De Grandy]]'', supra, at 1006, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 129 L. Ed. 2d 775. |