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FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

One day before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

One day before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the intelligence sharing loop after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] became more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have counter espionage information of considerable value in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic. In the summer of 1949 the FBI learned that the secret of the construction of the atom bomb had been stolen and turned over to a foreign power. An immediate investigation was undertaken which resulted in the identification of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs. <ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/atom/atom.htm The Atom Spy Case], FBI History, fbi.gov</ref> The JAEIC stated had they known in June about Fuchs, it would have impacted their estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities released in July which did not forsee the Soviet Union exploding its first nuclear device at the end of August in 1949. They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. However, espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not previously known to the FBI prior to 1946 but were mostly identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. Espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not known to the FBI prior to 1946 but many were identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

==Hiss and the UN==

==Hiss and the UN==