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Line 38: − − ==Second Sino-Japanese War== − − In 1937, when Japan invaded the Chinese mainland in the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]], the United States economy had relapsed into a depression and Roosevelt refused to apply the Neutrality Act but rather permitted arms shipments to China and Japan from United States arms manufacturers. The Neutrality Act did not require a declaration of war by an aggressor; it merely required the fact of war. The United States was the [[Nationalist Chinese]] government's only source of defense materials, while at the same time the United States was shipping six times as much to Japan as to China. The [[New Deal]] social programs needed the arms trafficking with Japan to keep people from becoming unemployed. As one commentator observed, President Roosevelt defied the mandatory provisions of the Neutrality Act because his administration required that at this moment America needed some of that "fool's gold" from Japan. − − In December 1937 an American gunboat, the ''Panay'', was bombed in the Yangtze River in China in the heart of the Sino-Japanese war area. Japan immediately apologized and agreed to pay full damages and to punish the guilty officers. Critics have observed, had the President taken care that the laws be faithfully executed under the Neutrality Act, the ''Panay'' would not have been protecting American oil tankers delivering oil in the midst of two warring armies in China. The purpose of the Neutrality Act was to avoid precisely an incident of this nature. − − ==Molotov-Ribbentrop pact== − After the signing of [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]] in what was called the Communazi alliance, [[Communist Party of the United States of America|American Communists]] denounced President Roosevelt for proposing that the Neutrality Act's embargo provisions be repealed to aid the countries that were fighting Hitler. <ref>''The Soviet World of American Communism'', Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes & Kyrill M. Anderson, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, pg. 75.</ref> − − Two weeks after [[World War II]] started, Roosevelt called Congress into extraordinary session to repeal the arms embargo provisions of the Neutrality Law and thus permit the sale of war materiel to England and France on a "cash and carry" basis, that is to say, the United States Treasury would not finance the purchase of U.S. produced arms to foreign powers. A Roper poll taken in September, 1939 showed a total of 2.5% public support for entering the war on the − side of England, France and Poland, 8.9% support for remaining neutral but supplying England, France and Poland with materials and food and refuse to ship anything to Germany, and the by the largest margin of any choice 37.5% support for remaining neutral but allowing arms sales to anyone on a cash and carry basis. <ref>''Roosevelt and Hopkins : An Intimate History'', Robert E. Sherwood, New York Harper and Brothers, 1948, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Roosevelt_and_Hopkins-An_Intimate_History-Robert_E_Sherwood-1948-1034pgs-GOV-POL.sml.pdf&id=252&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pg. 143, 146] pdf.</ref> − − − − ==References== − <references/> − − [[Category:history]]
redundant sects.
The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war. On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473. In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General George C. Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19. Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>
The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war. On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473. In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General George C. Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19. Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>
==Second Sino-Japanese War==
==Second Sino-Japanese War==