Hospital antitrust

Hospital antitrust concerns the many precedents relating to antitrust challenges to hospital monopolization. Leading precedents include:

Am. Chiropractic v. Trigon Healthcare, 367 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2004)

American Needle v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (Sherman Act ban applies when a conspiracy “joins together independent centers of decision making”)

Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992) (This precedent has been widely followed to exclude evidence of bad faith from lawsuits against hospitals for sham peer review.)

BCB Anesthesia Care v. Passavant Memorial Area Hosp. Ass’n, 36 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Although we hesitate to say that [a staffing decision at one hospital] . . . can never state an antitrust claim, we believe it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead some additional facts from which it can be inferred that the case falls within the ambit of the Sherman Act." Seglin v. Esau, supra. [769 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir.1985)] Before we enlist this court in the micromanagement of the staffing arrangements at Passavant under the aegis of the antitrust laws, we need better reasons than the plaintiffs have given us.").

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2009)

Gabaldoni v. Washington County. Hospital Ass'n, 250 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001)

Hein-Muniz v. Aiken Regional Med. Ctrs., 532 Fed. App’x 342 (4th Cir. 2013)

Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, 37 F.3d 1026 (4th Cir. 1994)

Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 1996)

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)

Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hosp., 560 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009)

Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.1991) (en banc)

Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2008)

Sugarbaker v. SSM Health Care, 190 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 1999)

Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co., 314 S.E.2d 166 (W. Va. 1983)

Tshibaka v. Sernulka, 673 Fed. App’x. 272 (4th Cir. 2016) (hospital “[i]mmunity applies unless—viewing the totality of the circumstances in an objectively reasonable manner—the aggrieved physician rebuts the presumption that the professional review action satisfied HCQIA.”)

Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 562 F.3d 599, 601 (4th Cir. 2009) ("The district court concluded most of Wahi's claims were barred because CAMC qualified for immunity from suit [**2] under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act ("HCQIA" or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 11101, et seq. (West 2005). For this reason, and because the district court found Wahi's other claims failed on the merits, the court awarded CAMC and [its Executive VP and CMO] summary judgment.").

Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 Fed. App’x 40 (4th Cir. 2003)

Procedure

Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996)

Nemet Chevrolet v. Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009)