The July Crisis

The July Crisis is the name given to a period of diplomatic maneuvering and military planning among the Great Powers of Europe in the early summer of 1914, culminating in the outbreak of World War I. It began on June 28, with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia, and is normally considered to have ended on August 4, with Great Britain's declaration of war on Germany. After this date, the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia were formally in hostilities with the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, with other combatants later joining on both sides.

The crisis was sparked by Austria-Hungary's determination to punish Serbia, which it believed to be behind the assassination of the archduke, which triggered the alliance systems and war plans of the other powers. The degree to which any one power was especially responsible for this chain of events has been hotly debated among historians and politicians since 1914, though Germany is most often singled out for culpability. Because of its results, including the war itself and the later aftermath of that conflict, the crisis is widely regarded as one of the most significant periods in 20th-century European and even world history.

See also: Causes of World War I

As 1914 began, the major European powers were divided into two rival alliance systems: the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. (However, the exact nature of these alliances differed from one case to another: Germany and Italy, for example, were only pledged to go to war in support of Austria-Hungary if Austria-Hungary was attacked by another power, not if she herself launched an aggressive war.) These alliances reflected the long-running grievances that existed between many nations: the French, for example, resented German occupation of Alsace-Lorraine, while Germans were angered over what they saw as British efforts to deny them their fair share of colonial territory in Africa. Militant nationalism, naval arms races, and imperialism all played a role in these tensions.

In the eyes of many statesmen and diplomats, the greatest danger spot was in the Balkans, where the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had led to heated competition between Russia and Austria-Hungary to dominate the region. Further complicating matters was the emergence of several small nations from Ottoman control, such as Bulgaria, Montenegro, and above all Serbia, all eager to establish their own position in southeastern Europe. Despite being client states of Russia from time to time, these nations fought a series of conflicts between themselves, known as the Balkan Wars, to gain territory and resources at each other's expense; these had only concluded in autumn 1913. Relations were also severely strained between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, due to the latter's annexation in 1908 of Bosnia, which was multiethnic but included a heavy contingent of Serbs. This complex political situation, and its readiness to break into open conflict at any moment, led some observers to warn that peace on the continent was very precarious, and that it would likely be a Balkan incident which dragged everyone into war. Still, as the summer of 1914 began, a general European war did not seem any more likely than it had in the preceding few years.

In June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, nephew and designated successor of Emperor Franz Josef I, visited Bosnia to attend military maneuvers and represent the monarchy to its relatively new subjects there. The trip was advertised well in advance, leading members of a quasi-terrorist Serbian nationalist group known as the Black Hand, which advocated Serbian annexation of Bosnia and its heavily Serb population, to plot the archduke's assassination. (Ironically, Franz Ferdinand had opposed Austrian takeover of Bosnia, seeing the region as more trouble than it was worth.)^[1] Supported by radical elements within the Serbian armed forces, several members of the Black Hand, armed with bombs and pistols, placed themselves in the streets of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, as the archduke's motorcade proceeded through the city on the morning of Sunday, June 28.^[2] An initial attack on the archduke's car with a bomb was unsuccessful, the projectile exploding in the road behind it; a short time later, however, one of the Black Hand conspirators, Gavrilo Princip, finding himself within close range of the vehicle, fired several shots that fatally wounded both Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie. Both would die minutes later.

Outside of Austria-Hungary, the initial response to the archduke's murder was relatively muted. Many of the Great Powers were dealing with their own internal problems (in France, fallout from recent elections; in Britain, a growing crisis over the extension of Home Rule to Ireland), and Russia, whose relations with Austria-Hungary had long been in poor shape, scarcely went to the trouble of expressing official condolences.^[3] Even within the Austrian court, there was little in the way of personal grief; though he had been friends with the Foreign Minister, Count Leopold von Berchtold, and some other government officials, relations between Franz Ferdinand and Emperor Franz Josef were frosty at best: the monarch's initial response to the news was said to be simply "It is God's will."^[4] Nonetheless, as Franz Ferdinand had been the heir apparent, his killing was regarded as an outrage by the government, especially as it had come at the hands of Serbian terrorists; now a significant power within the Balkans, Serbia's aggressiveness had exasperated Austrian leaders, many of whom--especially Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff--had been for years clamoring for a punitive war that would crush Serbia and indirectly reduce Russian influence in the region. As news of the archduke's murder sank in, Franz Josef agreed that some kind of action to punish Serbia was necessary; however, because Russian intervention in favor of Serbia might become a factor, he and his ministers felt it necessary to obtain the support of their more powerful German ally.

The "Blank Check"

Having had a long personal friendship with Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the Kaiser of Imperial Germany, Wilhelm II, was probably more deeply angered by the news from Sarajevo than any other European sovereign. Though mildly friendly to the Serbs beforehand, he now wrote, just two days after the assassination, that "matters must be cleared up with the Serbs {i.e., by military action}, and that right soon."^[5] Thus, when visited on July 5 by Austro-Hungarian ambassador Count Ladislaus de Szögyény-Marich, Wilhelm was prepared to seriously discuss the possibility of punitive war in the Balkans. Although the kaiser warned that he could not give definitive support to such a policy without consulting his Chancellor, Count Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, he added that in his own opinion, Austria ought to undertake military action against Serbia right away, and that if this led to a war with Russia, the Austrians could count on German support. These statements were substantially endorsed by Chancellor Bethmann himself in conversations with Szögyény the following day.^[6] These twin endorsements have since been described by historians as a "blank check" from Germany for Austrian war with Serbia (though it was assumed that the Austrians would launch such a war at once, and that it would be limited to, at the most, a German-Austrian-Russian-Serbian conflict).

Despite German insistence on the need for a speedy resolution of affairs, officials in Vienna dithered for the next week. Many of the Austrian army's soldiers from rural areas were home on leave to help in the summer harvest, and the Hungarian prime minister, István Tisza, was initially opposed to any kind of war against Serbia. Only on July 14 did Franz Josef's ministers finally agree to send an ultimatum to the Serbian government, stipulating a series of demands it must meet in response to the archduke's assassination. The main points of this ultimatum were that Serbia must suppress all propaganda and other written materials directed against Austria-Hungary; that all persons, in and out of the government and armed forces, who had been involved in the assassination must be arrested and stand trial; and that Austro-Hungarian officials be permitted to take part in both the investigation of the crime and the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda.

Though it was possible Serbia would agree to some of these demands (in fact, it had already begun arresting some of the conspirators), the requirement for involvement of Austrian officials risked compromising the nation's sovereignty to such a degree that this part of the ultimatum would likely be refused. Berchtold and the other ministers, in fact, expected this; at which point, according to their plan, they would launch the war, occupying at least the capital city of Belgrade and possibly the entire country.

While the sending of this ultimatum was agreed to on the 14th, it was also decided not to actually do so until the 25th, not only to give soldiers on leave time to return to duty, but also because of a summit being held in St. Petersburg, Russia, in the meantime, between Russian Tsar Nicholas II and French President Raymond Poincaré. By waiting until after the conclusion of this meeting, Berchtold hoped, Austria would deny Russia and France the chance to coordinate a response.

Despite the best intentions of Berchtold and his fellow ministers to keep France and Russia in the dark about Austria-Hungary's planned ultimatum, word of it leaked to the Russian embassy in Vienna, and by Saturday, July 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov had learned enough to deduce what the Austrians were up to regarding Serbia, and briefed Nicholas II on the unfolding situation the following day.

The day after that--Monday, July 20--French President Poincaré and Premier René Viviani arrived in St. Petersburg on board the battleship France. During the next three days of official ceremonies to mark the alliance between the two nations, Nicholas II and Sazonov brought both men up to date on the possibility of war in the Balkans; tsar and foreign minister expressed confidence in the outcome of a war with Austria, should they intervene on Serbia's behalf, and Poincaré in turn gave assurances that if Germany mobilized its armed forces in support of Austria, France would do the same in support of Russia. Warnings to this effect were conveyed to their potential opponents: Poincaré himself told the Austrian ambassador to Russia that "Serbia has very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an Ally, France. There are plenty of complications to be feared!" Meanwhile, Sazonov informed the German ambassador that "Russia would not be able to endure it if Austria-Hungary issued threatening language to Serbia or undertook military measures....whatever happens there must be no talk of an ultimatum."^[7]

Despite Sazonov's warning (which had not yet been communicated to Vienna anyway), Austria's ambassador to Serbia presented its ultimatum to the government in Belgrade on the evening of Thursday, July 23--the date had been moved up after the timing of the Franco-Russian conference was determined. The ambassador, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, read out the demands to the Serbian ministers, adding that they were being given forty-eight hours to accept the ultimatum; otherwise Austria would break off diplomatic relations, and war would follow.

News of the ultimatum was received by the Russian government the following morning; at once, Sazonov, who told a subordinate that he now "considered war unavoidable," met with the heads of the Russian armed forces to discuss a "partial" mobilization of the army against Austria-Hungary (though not against Germany), while other officials began withdrawing Russian assets from German banks as a precaution. A partial mobilization was approved by the Council of Ministers that afternoon (pending the Tsar's assent); immediately after which, Sazonov instructed Serbia's ambassador that his country should reject the ultimatum, and that it could count on Russian aid in case of a war: a message then repeated in a meeting with the German ambassador, Count Friedrich Pourtalès. These decisions in Russia on July 24 are regarded as the beginning of the most critical period of the "July Crisis."

Encouraged by Russian promises, the Serbian government announced on July 25 that it would comply only partially with the Austrian ultimatum; some of the measures demanded would be implemented, but the participation of Austrian officials in the criminal investigation was firmly rejected. On receiving Serbia's answer that evening, ambassador Gieslingen immediately left Belgrade, signaling the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Already that afternoon, Serbia had begun secret mobilization of its armed forces, though this was not yet publicly declared. Surprisingly (due in part to the attempt at secrecy), Austria-Hungary did not immediately mobilize in response, and would not do so until July 28.

Prior to the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, the Sarajevo assassination had faded into the background for most Europeans, including even many governments. Over the 24th and 25th, however, news first of the ultimatum and then of the beginning of Russian mobilization, which arrived in European capitals by Saturday evening, began awakening leaders to the possibility of at least a regional war. At once, proposals for mediating a peaceful end to the crisis, or at least for limiting its extent, were formulated. In Britain, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey suggested a four-power (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) mediation between Austria and Russia; the German government, by contrast, favored establishing a general agreement among all the powers to stay out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia--an arrangement that would obviously work to the advantage of Germany's ally, and thus Germany itself. For similarly self-interested reasons, France too rejected the idea of international mediation, as this would wreck the plans it and its Russian ally had worked out.